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ALL THE FREEDOM YOU CAN WANT:
THE PURPORTED COLLAPSE OF THE
PROBLEM OF FREE WILL
EDWARD C. LYONS*
INTRODUCTION
Reflections on free choice and determinism constitute a
recurring, if rarified, sphere of legal reasoning. From a practical
perspective, debate concerning human responsibility inevitably
surfaces in connection with legislative and judicial adoption of
the insanity defense,' and, to a lesser extent, in decisions
involving duress and necessity.2 In addition, although at an even
more abstract level, debate about human freedom plays a role in
every theoretical account of moral and legal culpability.
Controversy, of course, swirls around the perennially vexing
question of the propriety of punishing human persons for conduct
that they are unable to avoid. Drawing upon conditions similar,
if not identical, to those traditionally associated with attribution
of moral fault, persons subject to such necessitating causal
constraints generally are not considered responsible in the
* Associate Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law; B.A. University of San Francisco;
J.D., Notre Dame Law School; M.A., Ph.D., University of St. Thomas (Philosophy).
1 The existence of alternative legal tests of sanity and insanity illustrates the
complexity of the debate. A number of jurisdictions have supplemented the standard rule
requiring simply the ability to know the difference between wrong and right by also
providing a defense where the defendant may have such knowledge but was still "unable
to adhere to the right" as a result of irresistible impulse. U.S. v. Kunak, 17 C.M.R. 346,
359-60 (1954). The necessary conditions of both knowledge and the possibility of
conforming or not conforming one's action to such knowledge are reflected in the Modern
Penal Code's formulation of the insanity defense: "A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962)
(emphasis added).
2 For a discussion of responsibility relating to the affirmative defenses of duress and
necessity, see MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09, 3.02.
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requisite sense for their conduct; and, thus, they are not held
culpable for its consequences. 3
Such a position presupposes the common, but not
uncontroverted view, that alternative possibilities of conduct
exist for human actors in most circumstances; in other words,
that responsibility for conduct requires that human persons have
free choice about what they do. The controversy, of course, stems
from the fact that according to physical, behavioral, or
psychological deterministic accounts of human behavior-such a
demand is an impossibility.4
The standard argument asserts that free choice cannot exist
because determinism, as a property of laws governing the
cosmos, excludes such a possibility. This contingent factual
claim, however, has always been problematic. Contemporary
discussions-no doubt aware of this disputed factual premise-
draw upon a more novel, and arguably more devastating critique:
free will must be rejected because its very conception is
incoherent.
Rather than assuming the existence of determinism and
attempting to show its incompatibility with free will, this
argument begins with consideration of the idea of free choice and
concludes that, if it is to have any sense at all, it must be
compatible with determinism. A. J. Ayer outlined the argument
as follows:
But now we must ask how it is that I come to make my
choice. Either it is an accident that I choose to act as I do or
it is not. If it is an accident, then it is merely a matter of
chance that I did not choose otherwise; and if it is merely a
matter of chance that I did not choose otherwise, it is surely
irrational to hold me morally responsible for choosing as I
did. But if it is not an accident that I choose to do one thing
rather than another, then presumably there is some causal
3 See supra notes 1-2.
4 As one legal commentator describes it:
Our bodies and mental states, which are products of our genetic makeup and our past
experiences, explain why we do what we do. But we want to attribute freedom and
voluntariness only to individual agents who are architects of their own actions. And if
we are not responsible for our genetic makeup and past experiences, how can we be
responsible for our actions? How can we act voluntarily? We cannot.
Ronald J. Allen, Miranda's Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71, 77-78 (2006).
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explanation of my choice: [sic] and in that case we are led
back to determinism. 5
Obviously, no single treatment of the free will problem could
address all its nuances. This Article more modestly offers one
possible approach to the question. Part I elaborates in more
detail the view that the traditional conception of free choice is
incoherent and, thus, inevitably undermines the very
responsibility it is asserted to constitute; Part II considers the
resulting effort to develop a model of human freedom compatible
with determinism; and Part III, drawing upon the prior
discussions, describes-in terms of classical action theory-a
conception of free choice justifying personal moral and legal
responsibility that avoids both the incoherence of 'uncaused
freedom' as well as the shortcomings of determinism.
I. FREEDOM AIN'T WORTH NOTHIN' BUT IT'S FREE6
A. Responsibility: The Dilemma of Determinism and Autonomy
An actor's moral responsibility for conduct, on traditional
theory, is understood to be founded upon an intentional model of
choice. It conceives of human action as a process of self-
determination brought about through one's beliefs and desires. 7
5 A. J. AYER, Freedom and Necessity, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 275 (Macmillan & Co.
Ltd. 1965).
6 Cf. KRIS KRISTOFFERSON, ME & BOBBY MCGEE (Monument Records 1970), available
at http://www.elyrics.net/readlkkris-kristofferson-lyrics/me-and-bobby-mcgee-lyrics.html
(last visited Mar. 14, 2007) (serenading "[f]reedom's just another word for nothin' left to
lose and nothin' ain't worth nothin' but it's free").
7 As Sanford Kadish describes this traditional view:
[CIriminal liability is not governed solely by the social purposes of punishment. It is
governed as well by the moral justification of punishing people for both their
conduct and the results of their conduct. Indeed, criminal liability is best
understood as responding primarily to considerations of the latter kind ....
Central among the beliefs that underlie the criminal law is the distinction between
nature and will, between the physical world and the world of voluntary human
action. Events in the physical world follow one another with an inevitability, or
natural necessity, that is conspicuously absent from our view of voluntary human
actions.... Thus, the conception of causation appropriate to physical events is out
of place in the human realm.
... Human actions stand on an entirely different footing.... Except in special
circumstances, he [an agent] possesses volition through which he is free to choose
his actions. He may be influenced in his choices, but influences do not work like
wind upon a straw .... [H]is actions are his and his alone, not those of his genes or
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For this reason, such actions are thought to be attributed in a
special manner to an actor's personal agency and, therefore,
dissimilar to effects brought about through deterministic
physical causation.
Yet, based on the very same claim, determinists argue that
moral responsibility cannot be founded upon a model of choice so
understood. In their view, by rejecting the deterministic quality
of the causality underlying moral choices, the traditional view
would ipso facto render choice random and irrational, or, as Ayer
phrased it, "accidental." If beliefs and desires do not cause
choices, then choices cannot be attributed to the agent in the
sense required for attribution of personal responsibility.
One philosopher, Don Locke, suggests that this dilemma
reflects opposing intuitions of the nature of 'freedom.' The failure
to distinguish between these intuitions, Locke argues, confuses
discussions about the conditions necessary for moral
responsibility. He refers to one relevant sense of freedom as
'caused freedom' and the other as 'uncaused freedom.'
In the first sense, freedom entails the ability to act in accord
with one's beliefs and desires in a non-coerced, albeit
deterministic manner.8 The second sense of freedom proposes
that an agent could have uncategorically acted differently from
the way in which he did act. On this second understanding of
freedom, Locke asserts that such actions cannot be understood as
being 'caused' at all.
his rearing, because if he had so desired he could have chosen to do otherwise. This
is the perception that underlies the conception of responsibility[.]
Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of
Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 326-27, 30 (1985); see Edward C. Lyons, In Incognito-The
Principle of Double Effect in American Constitutional Law, 57 FLA. L. REV. 469, 493, 497-
98 (discussing the nature of intentional conduct and personal responsibility).
8
Soft determinism is the position that free will and determinism are compatible
inasmuch as 'free' means 'uncoerced,' not 'uncaused.' This position on the
controversy is ... widely held by English speaking philosophers. Among those
who have articulated and defended it are Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mill, Moore,
Ayer, and Nowell-Smith. Compatibilists in the present century often have
defended their position by proposing an analysis of 'could have done otherwise'
which is consistent with saying it of someone whose act is imputable to him
although it is caused.
JOSEPH M. BOYLE, GERMAIN GRISEZ, OLAF TOLLEFSEN, FREE CHOICE: A SELF-
REFERENTIAL ARGUMENT 105 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1976). Boyle et al. note a
succinct expression of compatibilism presented seventy-five years before Hobbes by
Michel du Bay in his De Libero Hominis Arbitrio Eiusque Potestate (Louvain 1563): 'What
comes about voluntarily comes about freely even if it comes about necessarily." See id. at
105 n.1, 195.
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B. 'Caused Freedom' and the Ability to Do Otherwise
In elaborating these notions, Locke explains that an agent who
acts freely in a 'caused' sense must be understood to cause his
actions by virtue of self-determining intentions. Any other
causal explanation of action would depend upon the implausible
proposition that "intentional" actions could be caused by
something other than reasons and wants. 9
By 'causality' in this context, Locke has in mind the standard
sense: "(a) every event has a sufficient cause; (b) at any given
time, given the past, only one future is possible; (c) given
knowledge of all antecedent conditions and all laws of nature, an
agent could predict at any given time the precise subsequent
history of the universe."10 On this understanding of 'causality,'
every effect is predetermined by its cause(s),1 1 and a 'same cause,
same effect' relation exists such that given a particular state of
the world all prior and subsequent events obtain unavoidably.
Of course, the notion of deterministic causation employed in
this conception of freedom does not exclude reference to the
efficacy of cognitive and deliberative psychological states. A
proper understanding of rational causal theories recognizes that
the influence of reasons and desires can be just as deterministic
as non-rational 'physical' forces. As Alasdair MacIntyre
described this view of causal efficacy:
9 As Locke proposes:
Now if an action is free in the sense that... he acts as he does only because he
is willing, then ... there need be no incompatibility between an action's being
free, in these senses, and its having a cause. Indeed these accounts fit
naturally, as they are meant to, with the self-determinist conception of free
action as action determined by the agent's wants and volitions.
Don Locke, Three Concepts of Free Action: I, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 97, 112 (John
Martin Fischer ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1986).
10 Bernard Berofsky, Determinism, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY
198 (Robert Audi ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
11 The notion of "causality" discussed here limits itself to the conception of scientific
causality understood in a deterministic sense. Contemporary models of scientific
causality, however, are not limited to this broad generalization. Some modern physical
theories propose statistical laws governing the probability of what are thought to be
inherently indeterminate events. As Kenneth Friedman states, "[d]eductibility of the
occurrence of the event entails the determinism of these universal laws, as probabilistic
laws would allow at most the deductibility of the probability of the occurrence of the
event." Kenneth S. Friedman, Analysis of Causality in Terms of Determinism, in 89 MIND
544 (Oxford Univ. Press 1980). An example of such laws is found in the theory of quantum
mechanics. Quantum mechanics proposes that the future locations of subatomic particles
are indeterminate and random although they behave with a predictability that can be
described by statistical laws.
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Behaviour is rational ... if, and only if, it can be
influenced, or inhibited by the adducing of some logically
relevant consideration .... For if giving a man more or
better information or suggesting a new argument to him is
a both necessary and sufficient condition for, as we say,
changing his mind, then we exclude, for this occasion at
least, the possibility of other sufficient conditions.... Thus
to show that behaviour is rational is enough to show that
it is not causally determined in the sense of being the
effect of a set of sufficient conditions operating
independently of the agent's deliberation or possibility of
deliberation. 12
Traditional moral theory must also reject such notions of
rational causation as an appropriate model for moral choice.
Envisioning antecedent psychological occurrences as
'determining events' or 'causes' of human choice inevitably
entails an 'intellectual' determinism that eliminates the
possibility of autonomous efficacy. If one's 'reasons' antecedent
to a choice constitute necessary and sufficient conditions of that
choice, then the possibility of choosing otherwise vanishes in the
face of those conditions. A 'cause,' in this sense, provides a
sufficient explanation for the subsequent effect. As a natural
corollary, if an agent is caused to choose a particular way, he
could not have chosen otherwise; and therefore, it is
inappropriate to praise or blame him for that choice. 13
1. The Bait and Switch
In response to this traditional objection, Locke notes that some
proponents of determinism ('caused freedom') offer an
explanation of one sense in which the agent conditionally could
have acted otherwise. It is, for example, undeniable that if the
agent had possessed different reasons he would have acted
otherwise. J.S. Mill offers an example:
12 A. C. MacIntyre, Determinism, 66 MIND 28, 34-5 (1957).
13 MacIntyre explains:
The discovery of causal explanations for our actions, preferences and decisions
shows that we could not have done other than we have done, that
responsibility is an illusion and the moral life as traditionally conceived a
charade. It makes praise and blame irrelevant, except in so far as we discover
these to be causally effective, and while the moral judgments of agents might
therefore retain some point, those of spectators and critics would be pointless.
Id. at 29.
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Take any alternative: say to murder or not to murder. I
am told, that if I elect to murder, I am conscious that I
could have elected to abstain: but am I conscious that I
could have abstained if my aversion to the crime, and
my dread of its consequences, had been weaker than the
temptation? If I elect to abstain: in what sense am I
conscious that I could have elected to commit the
crime.... When we think of ourselves hypothetically as
having acted otherwise than we did, we always suppose
a difference in the antecedents: we picture ourselves as
having known something that we did not know, or not
known something that we did know. 14
The view, however, that 'an agent could act differently if he
had different reasons,' that is, if and only if distinct logically
relevant considerations had been brought forward, does not
undermine a deterministic causal theory, but is entirely
consistent with it.
The proposal of such counterfactual interpretations of 'could
have done otherwise' then are insufficient to rebut traditional
objections. It is generally conceded that causal theories of
intentional action are not compatible with the view that the
agent had any real option to act differently. As Locke remarks,
"if all human behaviour is caused, then we are never able to do
other than what we do do, though it may often be true that we
are able to act otherwise if we want to."15 As numerous scholars
have observed, this form of argument is more than anything else
a 'bait and switch.' As MacIntyre notes: "protagonists of this
view.., are forced to do violence to ordinary linguistic usage in
order to uphold their case."1 6
C. 'Uncaused Freedom' and the Ability to Do Otherwise
Recognizing the inability of a purely conjectural sense of "could
have done otherwise" to account for free action "in any full and
important sense," Locke considers the meaning of "could have
done otherwise" entailed by more "substantive" notions of
14 J.S. MILL, AN EXAMINATION OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY, reprinted in
FREE WILL 60 (Sidney Morgenbesser and James Walsh ed., Engelwood Cliffs, 1962).
15 Locke, supra note 9, at 112.
16 Maclntyre, supra note 12, at 33.
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freedom.17 He believes that such a conception requires changing
the 'could' to 'can' and asserting that 'can' is not to be understood
conditionally:
[T]he 'can' in question is to be interpreted
categorically, as asserting that the agent actually was
able, at the time and on the occasion in question. To
say that he acted freely is not merely to say that there
are some circumstances in which he could have acted
differently; it is to say that he could actually have
acted differently, there and then.... [T]he 'can' in
question is not to be analysed wholly hypothetically, in
terms of what the agent would do in different
circumstances, .. . because that analysis makes
nonsense of the claim that he could have acted
differently in these very circumstances. For ... this is
to say that he would have acted differently in different
circumstances in these circumstances, which means
either that he would have acted differently in different
circumstances-which is not equivalent to the claim
that he could have acted differently in these
circumstances-or means nothing very clear at all.' 8
In order to account for the possibility of asserting that an actor
'can act otherwise,' Locke argues that it is necessary to posit a
different sort of freedom, namely, 'uncaused freedom.'19
Elaborating on this concept, Locke explains that in order for a
person 'unhypothetically' to be able to act differently from the
way he acted, an agent's action must simply be uncaused.
[I]f an action is free in the sense that the agent can act
differently from the way in which he actually does act,
then it follows that nothing causes him to act as he
does .... [O]n any understanding of causation, if
circumstances C are such as to cause E to occur, then
the non-occurrence of E given C is an empirical
impossibility.... Causal possibility is, after all, a
prime form of empirical possibility. Thus a free action,
in the sense of one where the agent is able to act
17 Locke, supra note 9, at 111 (describing ability of agent's conditional performance to
act differently than he wants to).
18 Id. at 107.
19 Id. at 110 (asserting there is nothing causing agent's actions where he can act
differently than he does).
[Vol. 22:1
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differently, will have to be one which lacks a
determining cause. 20
Positing some act of the agent, E, in reference to which it could
be hypothesized that the agent could instead unconditionally
perform some alternative act, E" and assuming E and E' are
incompatible actions, 21 then the agent's E-ing cannot be
understood as 'caused' act at all. This is so because on a causal
model, antecedent states of the world (both internal and external
to the agent) entail a static set of effects: If E is caused, E must
unavoidably obtain. If either E or E' could unconditionally occur,
then neither E nor E' could be caused.
1. Too Much Freedom
The difficulty, however, raised by a conception of choice as
'uncaused' action, is that even if it were a metaphysical
possibility, it appears even less likely than a deterministic model
to provide an adequate explanation of personal responsibility.
Given the absence of a causal connection between the agent and
the action, no meaningful basis remains for attributing the action
to the agent in any significant sense. Such actions would be too
free. As one legal commentator expresses it: "[c]hoices that
ultimately are a consequence of random fluctuations ... do not
embody any notion of free will worthy of respect ... or bear any
relationship at all to what passes in legal discourse for free will
(which involves identity, autonomy, agency, and so on)." 2 2 If
uncaused choice is the only sort of action about which it could be
claimed that a person really could have acted differently, nothing
remains in that action to justify its being attributed to the actor
in any meaningful sense.
Susan Wolf adopts this exact line of critique when she asserts
that the traditional conception of autonomy eliminates the
possibility of a moral agent. Responding to the traditional
"incompatibilist" position (i.e., the view that freedom necessary
20 Id. See generally Ted Honderich, Causes and Causal Circumstances as
Necessitating, in 78 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 63-86 (Compton Press
Ltd. 1977-78) (noting discussions of causality from which Locke appears to have
formulated his theory).
21 That is, it is a logical impossibility for the agent to perform both actions at the
same time.
22 Allen, supra note 4, at 77.
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for personal responsibility cannot be reconciled with
determinism), Wolf argues:
[N]o standard incompatibilist views about the
conditions of moral responsibility can be right, for,
according to these views, an agent is free only if he is
the sort of agent whose actions are not causally
determined at all.... The agent would be, in the
words, though not in the spirit, of Sartre, "condemned
to be free"-he could not both be free and realize a
moral ideal. 23
Free or autonomous choice, for Wolf, would imply an ability of
an agent to make 'radical' choices-radical because their
occurrence could only be explained by asserting that nothing
determines the choice: "[T]his ability to make radical choices is,"
she explains, "opaque. Since a radical choice must be made on no
basis and involves the exercise of no faculty, there can be no
explanation of why or how the agent chooses to make the radical
choices she does."24 To be truly autonomous, an agent must
choose without reference to any determinate basis. If antecedent
reasons or desires caused choice, then choice could no longer be
autonomous; it would be determined by antecedent, psychological
causal conditions.
As Don Locke summarizes this view: a person accepting the
notion of 'uncaused' freedom and rejecting the adequacy of
'caused' freedom to account for personal responsibility must
believe that "if an action is free in the sense that the agent can
act differently from the way in which he actually does act, then it
follows that nothing causes him to act as he does. 25
On similar grounds, Peter Westen has recently argued, in the
context of legal analysis, that any attempt to capture a successful
explanation of free choice is inevitably doomed to failure. 26 He
asserts that the "problem" of free choice is simply a 'false
problem' that human actors have unnecessarily created for
themselves. It is a false problem because it attempts to provide
23 Susan Wolf, Asymmetrical Freedom, 77.3 J. PHIL. 151, 162 (1980).
24 SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 54 (Oxford Univ. Press 1990) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter FREEDOM WITHIN REASON].
25 Locke, supra note 9, at 110.
26 See generally Peter Westen, Getting the Fly Out of the Bottle: The False Problem of
Free Will and Determinism, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 599 (2005).
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an explanation for that which, in its very conception, excludes
the possibility of being explained. Westen observes:
The supposed problem of free will and determinism is
as false as the question, "What is the expanding
universe expanding into?" It is a problem that we have
created for ourselves by posing questions in terms that
are inconsistent with the presuppositions that we
must necessarily invoke in addressing them.
The proper response to a false problem is not to
wrestle with it but to escape it. The proper response to
free will and determinism is to recognize that nothing
can possibly come of it and, hence, that nothing can
possibly turn on it. Just stop thinking about it. Just
think about something else!27
2. A Different Kind of Causality
Before concluding her analysis of free choice, Wolf raises for
consideration one final relation between reason, autonomy and
choice that she appears to have overlooked, 28 that is, the view
that reason can provide a basis for personal responsibility and
moral value, but that in order to do so, practical reason must be
much different than generally conceived of by determinists like
herself and others. Such a view, according to Wolf, would require
that the exercise of reason be understood to constitute a
particular sort of autonomy; as she describes it, "this ability itself
requires at least a kind of radical autonomy. That is ... the
possession of true rationality requires a kind of agency
incompatible with ordinary sorts of physical and psychological
determination."29 Wolf, however, offers no further reflections
about this alternative account of practical rationality.
Sidestepping further consideration of its possibility, she notes
simply that "the idea remains an interesting one, which I have
not fully or directly explored."30
Returning to her rejection of the traditional conception of
moral and legal culpability as rooted in personal autonomy, Wolf
27 Id. at 652.
28 See FREEDOM WITHIN REASON supra note 24.
29 Id. at 62.
30 Id.
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concedes that she has exhausted arguments supporting the view
that moral responsibility requires autonomy.31 In view of the
inability of that concept to resolve the problem of free will, Wolf
concludes that the only option is to explain choice bearing
personal responsibility on deterministic lines. For those who
would refuse to accept this determinist resolution, Wolf asserts,
the only satisfactory concept of a 'person' would implausibly
require "being a prime mover unmoved, whose deepest self is
itself neither random nor externally determined, but is rather
determined by itself - who is, in other words, self-created." 32
II. I STILL HAVEN'T FOUND WHAT I'M LOOKING FOR33
A. Rejection of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
Adopting the view that no notion of 'uncaused autonomy' could
account for a meaningful sense in which persons could be
responsible for their actions, many theorists redouble their
efforts to show how responsibility can be reconciled with
determinism.
Harry G. Frankfurt is a leading proponent of this view. His
defense of this "compatibilist" position (i.e., moral responsibility
is compatible with determinism) is found in the context of his
rejection of "the principle of alternate possibilities."34 "This
principle states that a person is morally responsible for what he
has done only if he could have done otherwise.... It has
generally seemed so overwhelmingly plausible that some
philosophers have even characterized it as an a priori truth."35
31 Id. at 61 (explaining, "I have exhausted all the reasons I can think of for believing
that responsibility requires not just the ability to act in accordance with Reason but also
the ability to act against it, for believing, that is, that responsibility requires not just
rationality but (radical) autonomy.").
32 Susan Wolf, Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS, NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 46, 52 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1987) [hereinafter Sanity].
33 U2, I Still Haven't Found What I'm Looking For, on THE JOSHUA TREE (Island
Records 1987), available at http://www.atu2.com/lyrics/songinfo.src?SID=56 (last visited
Mar. 15, 2007).
34 Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, 66 J. PHIL
828 (1969), reprinted in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 143, supra note 9 [hereinafter Alternate
Possibilities].35 Id.
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Frankfurt, however, denies that the unavoidability of action
precludes an agent's being responsible for it, and he asserts that
traditional conceptions of personal responsibility err in believing
that responsibility is precluded by unavoidability. "This, then, is
why the principle of alternate possibilities is mistaken. It asserts
that a person bears no moral responsibility-that is, he is to be
excused-for having performed an action if there were
circumstances that made it impossible for him to avoid
performing it."36
In Frankfurt's view, the fact that an agent may be determined
to perform some action will often be irrelevant in assessing moral
responsibility. 37 For, although conditions might exist that would
cause an agent to perform an action even if he did not want to, it
might be the case that he wanted to. 38 In such circumstances,
even if an agent could not act otherwise, it does not follow that he
performs the action simply because he could not do otherwise.
Frankfurt notes different senses of "being unable to do
otherwise." In once case, the statement, "I was unable to do
otherwise" functions as an excuse, that is, it absolves one from
responsibility. By means of the statement, the actor intends to
stress that in no way did the actor want to do what he or she did.
We understand the person who offers the excuse to
mean that he did what he did only because he was
unable to do otherwise or only because he had to do it.
And we understand him to mean, more particularly,
36 Id. at 151.
37 Frankfurt states:
The circumstances that made it impossible for him to do otherwise could have
been subtracted from the situation without affecting what happened or why it
happened in any way. Whatever it was that actually led the person to do what
he did, or that make him do it, would have led him to do it or made him do it
even if it had been possible for him to do something else instead.
... When a fact is in this way irrelevant to the problem of accounting for a
person's action it seems quite gratuitous to assign it any weight in the
assessment of his moral responsibility.
Alternate Possibilities, supra note 34, at 150-51.
38 "[There may be circumstances that constitute sufficient conditions for a certain
action to be performed by someone and that therefore make it impossible for the person to
do otherwise, but that does not actually impel the person to act or in any way produce his
action." Id. at 144.
Frankfurt suggests the case of an evil scientist monitoring the thoughts of a person the
scientist wants to act in a certain manner. Only if that person fails to act in the manner
desired by the scientist will the scientist intervene, and cause him to perform that act. See
Harry G. Frankfurt, Three Concepts: II, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 113, 119, supra note 9
[hereinafter Three Concepts: II].
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that when he did what he did it was not because that
was what he really wanted to do. 39
This does not, however, entail the conclusion that when an
agent does do what he really wants to do, that he could have done
otherwise.40 Even if one assumes that all actions are determined,
it may still be possible that an actor might really want to do what
he is determined to do and sometimes not. In other words, there
may be something about 'doing what one really wants to do' that
renders objections about its determined nature irrelevant.
Frankfurt acknowledges, nonetheless, that his position would
remain unresponsive to traditional concerns if it failed to refine
the causal account of what does explain an agent performing the
action 'he wanted to.' For, on simplistic causal explanations of an
agent 'wanting' to perform an action, he concedes that 'wanting'
can only be understood as occurring because the agent could not
avoid it.41 In such scenarios, no basis appears to exist for
asserting that an agent could ever act in a way he does not want
to act; accordingly, the agent could be understood to want things
only because he could not avoid it.
1. Frankfurt's Notion of Freedom
The success of Frankfurt's attempt to resolve anti-determinist
objections thus turns upon his technical understanding of what it
39 Alternate Possibilities, supra note 34, at 152.
40 Frankfurt elaborates:
The following may all be true: there were circumstances that made it
impossible for a person to avoid doing something; these circumstances actually
played a role in bringing it about that he did it, so that it is correct to say that
he did it because he could not have done otherwise; the person really wanted to
do what he did; he did it because it was what he really wanted to do, so that it
is not correct to say that he did what he did only because he could not have
done otherwise. Under these conditions, the person may well be morally
responsible for what he has done.
Id.
41 Frankfurt adds:
For if it was causally determined that a person perform a certain action, then it
will be true that the person performed it because of those causal determinants.
And if the fact that it was causally determined that a person perform a certain
action means that the person could not have done otherwise, as philosophers
who argue for the incompatibility thesis characteristically suppose, then the
fact that it was causally determined that a person perform a certain action will
mean that the person performed it because he could not have done otherwise.
Id. at 151-52.
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means for an agent 'to do what he really wants to do.' 42 For
Frankfurt this concept functions both as a definition of free will
as well as the distinguishing characteristic of the volitional
apparatus of human persons.
In his view, human persons differ from non-personal entities in
that, in addition to having competing basic desires to perform
actions or to want various objects (termed "first-order desires"),
persons have the added ability to reflect upon and evaluate first-
order desires. Frankfurt refers to these reflexive evaluations as
"second-order desires."43 By virtue of second-order desires,
human persons, in turn, form 'second-order volitions' through
which they specify which first-order desire they want to be their
'effective first-order desire,' or, as Frankfurt defines it, one's
'will.' 44 It is in reference to humans acting according to second-
order volitions that Frankfurt speaks of human agents doing
what they really want: "Someone does what he really wants to do
only when he acts in accordance with a pertinent higher-order
volition."45 What distinguishes an entity with second-order
volitions from an entity lacking them, then, is that the former is
personally involved in what his will is, that is, only a person has
a view about which first-order desire becomes effective.
Entities lacking second-order reflexive perspectives or
evaluations of their basic, first-order desires are referred to by
Frankfurt as 'wantons.'46 Wantons may have a multiplicity of
42 Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, reprinted in
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 65, 67, supra note 9 [hereinafter Concept of a Person].
43 Frankfurt believes that:
Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may
also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are
capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from
what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call
"first-order desires" or "desires of the first order," which are simply desires to
do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however,
appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in
the formation of second-order desires.
Id.
44 Frankfurt reserves the notion of "will" for a first-order desire that is "an effective
desire--one that moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action." Id. at 68.
45 Harry Frankfurt, Identification and Wholeheartedness, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS, NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 27, 34, supra note
32 [hereinafter Wholeheartedness].
46 Frankfurt describing "wantons":
The essential characteristic of a wanton is that he does not care about his will.
His desires move him to do certain things, without its being true of him ei~her
that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by
other desires .... What distinguishes a rational wanton from other rational
2007]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
desires that struggle with one another before any one of them
spurs the entity to action. Yet, a wanton, though experiencing
consciously the struggle between first-order desires and its
resolution, has no (higher-level) preference as to which first-order
desire effectively motivates to action; the wanton has no
preference about his 'will'.
Based on this analysis, Frankfurt asserts that it is only a
person, i.e., an entity with second-order volitions, that "is not
only free to do what he wants to do; he is also free to want what
he wants to want."47 In contrasting the significance of this
freedom compared to the unhindered freedom to act according to
a first-order desire, Frankfurt remarks, "[i]t seems to me that [a
person] has, in that case, all the freedom it is possible to desire or
to conceive. There are other good things in life, and he may not
possess some of them. But there is nothing in the way of freedom
that he lacks."48
Higher-level motivations, and particularly the resolution of
second-order desires into volitions, are essentially personal in
nature. First-order desires are given by nature and arise
passively with little effort on the part of the agent as such, while
formation of evaluative judgments (i.e., second-order desires) and
definitive identification with one or other first-order desire (i.e.,
second-order volition) requires a reflexive activity of the agent:
The pertinent desire is no longer in any way external
to him. It is not a desire he "has" merely as a subject
in whose history it happens to occur .... It comes to
be a desire that is incorporated into himself by virtue
of the fact that he has it by his own will.49
agents is that he is not concerned with the desirability of his desires
themselves. He ignores the question of what his will is to be. Not only does he
pursue whatever course of action he is most strongly inclined to pursue, but he
does not care which of his inclinations is the strongest.
Concept of a Person, supra note 42, at 71.
47 Id. at 77. And adding in pertinent part:
More precisely, it means, that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to
have the will he wants. Just as the question about the freedom of an agent's
action has to do with whether it is the action he wants to perform, so the
question about the freedom of his will has to do with whether it is the will he
wants to have.
Id. at 75.
48 Id. at 77.
49 Wholeheartedness, supra note 45, at 38.
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Assessing this conception of freedom, Frankfurt points out that
it satisfies a number of criteria believed necessary for any
adequate theory of the will. First, it explains why humans are
correct in not attributing free will to other types of entities; only
entities with second-order desires are capable of this. Second, it
explains why freedom of will is desirable, for inasmuch as human
persons have second-order volitions, conformity of the will (i.e.,
an effective first-order desire) with those volitions is experienced
as a sui generis fulfillment of a higher-level desire, while the non-
fulfillment of second order volitions is experienced as a unique
frustration.50
Raising a third point, Frankfurt considers whether his theory
of free will satisfies the conditions of moral responsibility some
assert can be satisfied only by an ability to act otherwise.
Frankfurt reiterates his belief that the ability to choose
alternatively is irrelevant to the question of moral responsibility:
In my view.., the relation between moral
responsibility and the freedom of the will has been
very widely misunderstood.
... For the assumption that a person is morally
responsible for what he has done does not entail that
the person was in a position to have whatever will he
wanted. 51
Thus, moral responsibility depends not upon whether a person
could have acted differently, but simply on whether the person
really wanted to perform the action that he did. Even if all
human processes and actions are systematically determined,
personal responsibility for conduct obtains whenever a person's
second-order volition corresponds to his efficacious first-order
desire. 52 If that condition is satisfied, it is irrelevant whether the
person could have acted differently: "It is in securing the
conformity of his will to his second-order volitions, then, that a
person exercises freedom of the will."53
50 Id.
51 Concept of a Person, supra note 42, at 78-79 (emphasis added).
52 Id. at 67.
53 Id. at 75.
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Even supposing that he could have done otherwise, he
would not have done otherwise; and even supposing
that he could have had a different will, he would not
have wanted his will to differ from what is was.
Moreover since the will that moved him when he acted
was his will because he wanted it to be, he cannot
claim that his will was forced upon him or that he was
a passive bystander to its constitution. Under these
conditions, it is quite irrelevant to the evaluation of
his moral responsibility to inquire whether the
alternatives that he opted against were actually
available to him. 54
A person would then be doing what he wants to want to be
doing, and willing what he wants to be willing. In such a case,
Frankfurt concludes, the attribution of moral responsibility does
not depend upon an ability to do otherwise.
2. Critique of Frankfurt's View
a. The Complexity of Human Choice
Frankfurt's view unquestionably offers a nuanced account of
free will which, despite its latent difficulties, proves useful for
understanding conditions necessary for the possibility of personal
choice.
By positing differing orders of motivational factors, Frankfurt's
system provides a foundation for more accurately describing the
complexity experienced in human deliberation and choice. While
some desires are experienced as first-order, that is, basic desires
for objects or actions, other desires arise from reflexive,
introspective evaluations about those first-order desires. 55 These
higher-order evaluations, in turn, have their own specific
motivational and experiential character.
54 Id. at 79.
55 Frankfurt explains his view:
The notion of reflexivity seems to me much more fundamental and
indispensable, in dealing with the phenomena at hand, than that of a
hierarchy. On the other hand, it is not clear to me that adequate provision can
be made for reflexivity without resorting to the notion of a hierarchical
ordering. While articulating volitional life in terms of a hierarchy of desires
does seem a bit contrived, the alternatives ... strike me as worse: more
obscure, no less fanciful, and (I suspect) requiring a resort to hierarchy in the
end themselves.
Wholeheartedness, supra note 45, at 34 n.7.
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Frankfurt's account also recognizes that deliberation is not
simply a process of quietly picking from among one's second-
order desires. Deliberation is characterized by the conscious
interaction of a variety of motivational factors of different orders,
some of which are passively experienced or "given," and others
the agent more actively participates in constituting. Successful
acts of free will, under any description, require performative
skills and perfections guaranteeing appropriate management of
the various human capacities involved in a single human
choice. 56
This complex account also provides Frankfurt with the means
to distinguish a number of different "types" of human action:
free, unfree, wanton, reflexive, first-order choice, second-order
choice, and so on. First-order actions in accord with second-order
volitions are free not simply because the person performing the
action 'wants' at some basic level to perform it, but because the
agent is carrying out the action he 'wants to want' to perform.
This cannot be said of actions determined solely at the level of
first-order desire, when either no second-order volition has been
formed, or when the agent's effective first-order desires are not in
conformity with second-order volitions. Such actions are not acts
of free will.
In sum, Frankfurt's view is valuable because it provides a
relatively precise, rational account of what distinguishes
intentional, free human action from human acts which are
neither intentional nor free. More unrefined versions of
determinism, for example, posit freedom simply as constituted by
unfettered internal motivation, and fail to offer any nuanced
criteria by which the introspective complexity of choice can be
accounted for. Even pre-theoretical intuition suggests, however,
that some distinctions must be made between 'free' and 'unfree'
actions. Cases of action based on mania, intoxication, or fits of
passion are common instances of action that would fit into this
morally unfree category of conduct. Further, Frankfurt's view
provides a model for understanding the difference between
human persons and non-personal entities that do not share that
same complex of faculties.
56 For further discussion of the broader framework of human choice and performative
skills, see infra note 168.
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Frankfurt's model, then, should be considered among the more
refined accounts of intentional action. While it is true on any
conceptualization of intentional conduct that belief and desire
account for action, this description standing alone gives no
indication of the variety of hierarchical relations and conflicts
which can exist among the cognitive and motivational factors
influencing human choice. By isolating differences in varying
conditions of the evaluative and motivational state of human
persons, Frankfurt is able to develop a relatively thick theory of
human action.
b. Determinism by Any Other Name
Nonetheless, while Frankfurt proposes interesting and
important insights into the complexity of practical reasoning and
choice connected with personal reflexivity, his position in the end
fails to counter traditional objections. While Frankfurt believes
he has located a meaningful resolution to the free will problem in
the distinction between 'persons' and 'wantons,'-as constituted
through the difference between first-order desires and second-
order volitions-this distinction does not bear the weight he
assigns to it.
Despite his considerable jockeying, Frankfurt's theory cannot
avoid the most basic objection of the anti-determinist. In
particular, it has not demonstrated how a meaningful sense of
choice is preserved if one's second-order volitions themselves
result from processes that are causally determined. Frankfurt
himself concedes the possibility of such an anomaly: "[i]t seems
conceivable that it should be causally determined that a person is
free to want what he wants to want. If this is conceivable, then it
might be causally determined that a person enjoys a free-will."57
But, if what Frankfurt allows is 'conceivable' actually obtains,
then the reflexive 'self-determination' or 'self-constitution'
brought about through second-order volitions is causally
predetermined into the psychological life of the person, and the
agent contributes nothing original. The very process of resolving
one's second-order desires into second-order volitions would itself
be causally determined, and no reason would exist to ascribe to
that "mechanical" stage of the process the peculiarly personalist
57 Concept ofa Person, supra note 42, at 80 (emphasis added).
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implications that Frankfurt attempts to derive. 58 'Person' in this
context, would describe a mere functional or structural nexus,
albeit a self-conscious one, between preceding causal influences
and the determination of various levels of subjective motivations.
While Frankfurt may have stumbled upon an interesting
complexity of the process by which motivations causally work
themselves out into action, nothing about his system allows the
person to 'constitute' himself or herself in anything other than a
trivial sense. While persons may be more complex than wantons,
it would be a complexity that lacks ethical significance. As it is
true that wantons have no interest in what they want, persons
would have no interest in what they want to want.
This ultimate failure to undermine traditional objections can
be brought into clearer focus by considering the exact sense in
which Frankfurt understands his position to be 'compatibilist.'
This term is misleading if understood in the Kantian sense of a
compatibility between freedom and nature. Kant's compatibilist
account, resolving the third antimony of reason set out in the
Critique of Pure Reason, requires that each human act can and
should be viewed both as a product of inexorable laws of
antecedent causality of nature and, from a different perspective,
as the result of spontaneous freedom operating independently of
nature-as a completely unconditioned condition, autonomous
and not antecedently determined. 59
58 See Gary Watson, Free Agency, 72.8 J. PHIL. 205, 218 (1975) challenging
Frankfurt's position:
We wanted to know what prevents wantonness with regard to one's higher-
order volitions. What gives these volitions any special relation to "oneself'? It is
unhelpful to answer that one makes a "decisive commitment," where this just
means that an interminable ascent to higher orders is not going to be
permitted ....
... It does not tell us why or how a particular want can have, among all of a
person's "desires," the special property of being peculiarly his 'own.'
Id.
59 Kant's view depends, of course, upon his limitation of speculative reason to
appearances, thus opening up the possibility of a distinctly spontaneous noumenal reality
remaining available to practical reason as posited in "das Ding an sich," the 'thing in
itself.' He explains:
Morality does not, indeed, require that freedom should be understood, but only
that it should not contradict itself, and so should at least allow of being
thought, and that as thus thought, it should place no obstacle in the way of a
free act (viewed in another relation) likewise conforming to the mechanism of
nature. The doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature may each,
therefore, make good its position. This, however, is only possible in so far as
criticism has previously established our unavoidable ignorance of things in
themselves, and has limited all that we can theoretically know to appearances.
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For Kant, then, moral responsibility entails a notion of
autonomy that cannot be identified with or reduced to
determinism. His sense of 'compatibility' does not collapse one
concept into the other, but demands that the human conduct be
viewed from different perspectives as free and as determined.
Frankfurt, on the contrary, proposes that moral responsibility
is not merely compatible with determinism in Kant's sense, but
that moral responsibility can itself be a form of determinism. As
long as a person "wants what he wants to want" it makes no
difference if the person is determined causally to this condition or
not. In fact, Frankfurt's view is not, strictly speaking, really a
'compatibilism' at all, but a matter of definition. Moral freedom
need not be coordinated with determinism because moral
freedom properly understood just is (a form of) determinism.
In the end, no matter how many successive layers of desire
may be posited, deterministic resolution of choice is incapable of
generating any irreducible sense of efficacy attributable to the
person, and, therefore, is incapable of grounding meaningful
responsibility in the person. 6O Robert Nozick, reflecting on
deterministic positions similar to Frankfurt's, appropriately
... [Tihe assumption... [of] freedom.., is not permissible unless at the same
time speculative reason be deprived of its pretensions to transcendent insight.
For in order to arrive at such insight [speculative reason] must make use of
principles which, in fact, extend only to objects of possible experience, and
which, if also applied to what cannot be a possible experience, always really
change this into an appearance, thus rendering all practical extension of pure
reason impossible. I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in
order to make room for faith. ["Ich musste also das Wissen aufheben, um zum
Glauben Platz zu bekommen ...."].
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 28-29 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., St.
Martin's Press 1968) (1929). For a survey of Kant's attempts to reconcile the relation
between the two standpoints of freedom and nature, see, e.g., John R. Silber, The Ethical
Significance of Kant's Religion, in RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE, at
xcvii-ciii (Theodore Greene and Hoyt Hudson trans., Harper Torchbooks 1960).
60 Consider Frederick Ferr6's comment, just as applicable to Frankfurt's effort as it is
to simpler models of motivational chains:
It follows from philosophical determinism that every event in each human life
is the necessary outcome of prior conditions themselves previously determined
by others and so on ad infinitum ....
(1) It is always artificial, given a deterministic metaphysic, to isolate any
particular earlier link in an unbroken causal chain as more essentially "the
cause" of a later event in the chain than any other, or combination of
others. ...
(2) This being so, it is always arbitrary to direct our moral assessments to
persons. Why, in the nature of things as the determinist sees them, should the
proximate point in the world line of the universe at which a person forms a
minor part be singled out for special attention?
Frederick FerrY, Self-Determinism, 10.3 AM. PHIL. Q. 165, 173 (1973).
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notes their inability-no matter how complex-to adequately
account for personal responsibility:
It will be pointed out that we are not extremely simple
input-output devices, much internal processing takes
place, involving feedback loops and other delightful
"software"; however, does that not make us merely
more complicated puppets, but puppets nonetheless?
True, much of these causes occur "inside" us-is it
better to be a hand puppet than a marionette?61
III. FREEDOM AT POINT ZERO6 2
The preceding discussions have attempted to explicate the
principal contours of the dilemma that surfaces when one
attempts to understand personal responsibility on either a
deterministic or an autonomous model. As one legal scholar has
described this puzzle:
[The problem of free will] arises when people seize
upon determinism's success in accounting for the
behavior of physical bodies ... and ponder how it
might apply to ... intentional agents; and it arises
when people seize upon what they believe must be the
alternative to determinism, i.e., free will, and try to
explain it.63
As formulated by models of 'caused freedom,' choice results
from an entirely deterministic psychological matrix, and the
result, as expected, conforms to those determined antecedent
conditions; similarly, theories of 'uncaused freedom,' by positing
the coming about of events entirely independent of causal
conditions, results in a conception of free choice that loses any
meaningful connection with the agent's intentional activities.
Thus, in one way or another, each of these options undermines
human responsibility.
In view of this impasse, Susan Wolfs suggestion of a possible
alternative understanding of practical reason-one that she
61 ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 310 (Harvard Univ. Press 1981).
62 JEFFERSON STARSHIP, Freedom at Point Zero, on FREEDOM AT POINT ZERO (RCA
1979), available at http://www.lyricsfind.com/j/jefferson-starship/87761.html (last visited
Mar. 16, 2007).
63 See Westen, supra note 26, at 603 (emphasis added).
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raises for consideration but summarily abandons-takes on
special significance. As she described it, such a theory of
practical reasoning would "itself require[] ... a kind of radical
autonomy. ... [T]rue rationality requires a kind of agency
incompatible with ordinary sorts of physical and psychological
determination." 64
A. Autonomous Rationality-A Different Sort of Causality
The preceding reflections suggest that the problem of free will
can be resolved, if at all, only by an explanatory account of the
role of reasons and desires in free choice that avoids two
extremes. On the one hand, these factors cannot be understood
to function as antecedent sufficient causes of choice; and at the
same time, they cannot be understood to be so completely
unrelated to the determination of choice, that it is rendered
essentially random and irrational, unconnected with the
intentional and affective life of a human person. Reasons and
desires, then, must have some explanatory function with respect
to free choice but not too much.
A positive account of free choice, then, must invalidate Peter
Westen's assertion that 'the problem of free choice' inevitably
collapses upon itself by being framed in terms that negate the
possibility of its resolution. 65 A positive account of free choice
must establish that it is not a 'false problem' precisely by
showing its coherence, or more succinctly stated, by solving it.
In broad strokes, the remainder of this Article attempts to
satisfy this demand through a detailed exposition of free choice
as understood by Thomas Aquinas. Reliance on Aquinas for this
purpose, though perhaps unexpected in some circles, is
appropriate because he constitutes, at least arguably, the leading
historical defender of the traditional conception of free choice as a
condition for personal responsibility. 66
64 FREEDOM WITHIN REASON, supra note 24, at 62 (emphasis added).
65 See Westen, supra note 26, at 652 (concluding "[tihe proper response to a false
problem is not to wrestle with it but to escape it").
66 Thomas' most complete treatment of practical reason, will, and its proper acts is
found in the his SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, (Benzinger Bros. 1947-8) (Fathers of English
Dominican Province trans.) [hereinafter SUMMA THEO.] (All translations from the Latin in
subsequent texts, however, are the author's unless otherwise indicated.). The breadth of
analysis found there presumably represents, consistent with its relatively late dating in
the life of Aquinas, his final and most mature thought. For this reason, the following
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Responding, for example, to a position similar in broad strokes
to Frankfurt's, i.e., that human choice can be necessitated but
not in an unnatural, coercive manner that would be contrary to
what the person really wants to do,67 Thomas responds:
[T]his opinion.., does away with praise and blame in
human actions. For there is no praise or blame in
doing necessarily what one cannot avoid. ... Not
only ... is it contrary to the faith, but it undermines
all moral philosophy. If there is not something in us
that is free, but instead we are necessarily moved to
willing things, then deliberation, exhortation,
precepts, punishment, and praise and blame, that is,
all the things moral philosophy concerns itself with,
are undermined. 68
B. The Acts of Will
Aquinas's account of free choice, like Frankfurt's, depends
upon a nuanced elaboration of intellectual and appetitive acts.
In the course of articulating his conception of human action,
Thomas describes a variety of 'moments' constitutive of personal
choice. 69
discussion will rely primarily upon Thomas' analysis of the will offered in that work and
pass over almost entirely the controversial question of whether Aquinas' such a view
reflects any substantive change when compared to his earlier writings. See generally
Daniel Westberg, Did Aquinas Change His Mind About the Will?, 11 THE THOMIST 41
(1994).
67 This position has been attributed to late 13th century Latin Averroists in Paris,
among whom were included Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. For historical
discussion of the controversy see John F. Wippel, The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at
Paris, Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies (1977) at 169-201, and JAMES
WEISHEIPL, FRIAR THOMAS D'AQUINO: HIS LIFE, THOUGHT & WORKS, (Catholic University
of America, 1974) at 272-80.
68 "Haec autem opinio... tollit enim rationem meriti et demeriti in humanis actibus.
Non enim videtur esse meritorium vel demeritorium quod aliquis sic ex necessitate agit
quod vitare non possit.... Non solum contrariatur fidei, sed subvertit omnia principia
philosophiae moralis. Si enim non sit liberum aliquid in nobis, sed ex necessitate
movemur ad volendum, tollitur deliberatio, exhortatio, praeceptum et punitio, et laus et
vituperium, circa quae moralis Philosophia consistit." ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ON EVIL ("DE
MALO") q. 6, corp. (Jean Oesterle trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1989) [hereinafter DE
MALO].
69 Aquinas's distinction between the acts of the will is most properly understood not
so much as a series of metaphysically distinct acts, but rather as illustrating logically
distinguishable aspects of volition. Alan Donagan suggests that the distinction of the acts
is recognized most clearly not by introspection but by the failure of action at various
points of progress. See Alan Donagan, Thomas Aquinas on Human Action, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATER MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 654, 654 (N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny
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The following discussion commences, then, with consideration
of the three most fundamental modes in which Aquinas
understands the will to incline or "gravitate" toward objects:
'voluntas,' 'intentio,' and 'electio.'70 This unavoidably technical
analysis provides the necessary framework for subsequent
articulation of Aquinas' full account of the possibility and nature
of free choice.
1. Voluntas or Will
Thomas notes that the term 'voluntas' can be understood to
refer either to the will itself as a faculty, potency, or power
(potentia), or it can refer to a particular act of that faculty.71 (As,
for example, the term 'vision' can refer either to the faculty of
sight itself or to a particular act of seeing, 'a vision'). When
'voluntas' designates 'the will' as a faculty, the term 'object of the
will' designates things that can be the focus of the will as 'ends'
(fines) or as 'means,' that is, 'things directed to an end' (ea quae
sunt ad finem).72
The distinction between an 'end' and a 'means' arises out of a
difference in the functional way that the will is attracted to each.
'Ends' are understood to be objects of the will in the most proper
sense because they alone are willed directly, i.e., they are
attractive as goods in themselves. 'Means,' however, are 'goods'
only insofar as they are instrumental or conducive to some other
object, that is, an end. 'Means' then are willed as "good' only
because they are attractive as conducive to some end.73 While
& J. Pinborg eds., 1982). For Aquinas' full discussion see SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at
I-I, q. 8-17.
70 For survey treatments of Aquinas' theory of the will acts, see Donagan, supra note
69, at 642-54; see also RALPH MACINERNY, AQUINAS ON HUMAN ACTION: A THEORY OF
PRACTICE 51-74 (Catholic Univ. of Am. Press 1992); David M. Gallagher, Thomas Aquinas
on the Causes of Human Choice 169-77 (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic
Univ. of Am., 1988); David M. Gallagher, Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational
Appetite, 29 J. HIST. PHIL. 559, 559-84 (1991); Marianne Miller Childress, Efficient
Causality in Human Actions, 28 THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, 191-222 (1950-51).
71 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I-II, q. 8, a. 2. "'Will' refers sometimes to the
faculty itself by which we will, and sometimes to an act of 'will' itself." ("[V]oluntas
quandoque dicitur ipsa potentia qua volumus; quandoque autem ipse voluntatis actus.").
Similar usage exists in English insofar as one can speak of the will as a faculty, and also
inquire about "what someone's will is"?
72 For further discussion of the distinction between 'ends' and 'means' in relation to
human choice, see, e.g., Lyons, supra note 7, at 500-03.
73 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I-II, q. 5, a. 2. "That which is in itself good and
willed is the "end." Hence "will" is most properly spoken of in relation to the end. Means,
however, are not good or willed in themselves, but in relation to the end. Whence, the
[Vol. 22:1
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both ends and means share in the notion of being attractive to
the will, they do so under differing rationales.7 4
In support of this distinction, Aquinas calls to mind the
common experience of being drawn to appreciate the desirability
of some object without, however, engaging in a consideration of
how one might obtain it. On the other hand, persons do not
experience themselves willing something as instrumental or
useful without actually having some other object in mind as an
end.75
Based on this distinction, Thomas proposes that the meaning
of 'voluntas,' when designating an act of the will, refers to its
most proper act as inclining to an object directly as an 'end' and
not derivatively as a 'means.'76 Accordingly, 'voluntas' refers to a
basic inclination of the will to an object simply or per se, insofar
as the object is, in one way or another, intrinsically appealing.
2. Intentio or Intention
In contrast to this simple act of the will inclining to an 'end'
denoted by 'voluntas,' Thomas employs the term 'intentio' or
'intention' to refer to a more complex mode of the will's actuality.
'Intention' designates not only an interest or inclination to an
attractive end, but includes also the notion of an active
"will" is not moved to a means, except insofar as it it moved to the end. Accordingly, what
is willed in the means is the end" (emphasis added). ("Id autem quod est propter se
bonum et volitum, est finis. Unde voluntas proprie est ipsius finis. Ea vero quae sunt ad
finem, non sunt bona vel volita propter seipsa, sed ex ordine ad finem. Unde voluntas in
ea non fertur, nisi quatenus fertur in finem: unde hoc ipsum quod in eis vult, est finis").
74 Id. at I-II, q. 8, a. 2. "The notion of good, which is the object of the power of the will,
is found not only in an end, but also in means." ("Ratio autem boni, quod est obiectum
potentiae voluntatis, invenitur non solum in fine, sed etiam in his quae sunt ad finem").
75 Id. at I-Il, q. 8, a. 3. "An end is willed for its own sake, but a means, insofar as it is
such, is not willed except for the end; Thus, it is clear that the will can be moved to the
end without being moved to a means; but with respect to means, insofar as they are such,
the will cannot be moved, unless it be moved to the end itself." ("[C]um finis sit secundum
se volitus, id autem quod est ad finem, inquantum huiusmodi, non sit volitum nisi propter
finem; manifestum est quod voluntas potest ferri in finem sine hoc quod feratur in ea
quae sunt ad finem; sed in ea quae sunt ad finem, inquantum huiusmodi, non potest ferri,
nisi feratur in ipsum finem").
76 Id. at I-I, q. 8, a. 2. "If we speak about the will according to its proper act, we
properly refer only to an end. For every act named with respect to its faculty is so named
with respect to the most basic act of that faculty; as 'intellection' refers to the basic act of
the intellect. But the basic act of a faculty refers to that which is in itself the object of the
power." (Si autem loquamur de voluntate secundum quod nominat proprie actum, sic
proprie loquendo, est finis tantum. Omnis enim actus denominatus a potentia, nominat
simplicem actum illius potentiae: sicut intelligere nominat simplicem actum intellectus.
Simplex autem actus potentiae est in id quod est secundum se obiectum potentiae").
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inclination to acquire that end through some means. 77 Intention,
then, includes all the dynamism of the will implied by 'voluntas'
and more; it envisions the will as being animated not only by an
inclination to a desired end, but also with the added inclination
to attain that good through some instrumental means.
This added notion of a volitional commitment to bring about an
end through means, however, does not require positing two
separate, distinct acts of willing. For, as Aquinas explains, the
very inclination of the will toward an end itself accounts for an
inclination to a means. Thus, intention is perhaps best
understood as a more intensive and extensive mode of 'voluntas,'
that is, willing-an-end-through-means.78 Intentio then designates
a conception of 'willing' an object grasped as an end with special
focus on the extension of that inclination to other objects or other
actions rationally grasped as instrumental to the intended end.
In this context, Aquinas clarifies that intentions do not bear
only upon means instrumental to the attainment of a single, final
ultimate end. Rather, intermediate means themselves can
become the subject of intentions, if they too must be brought
about by other instrumentalities. In such a case, intention must
be exercised with respect to those intermediate means
understood as intermediate 'ends.' 79  This insight provides
77 Id. at I-II, q. 12, a. 1, ad 3. 'The will does not order, but tends to some object
according to the order of reason. Hence, 'intention' designates an act of the will,
presupposing an ordination of reason ordering something to the end." ("[V]oluntas quidem
non ordinat, sed tamem in aliquid tendit secundum ordinem rationis. Unde hoc nomen
intentio nominat actum voluntatis, praesupposita ordinatione rationis ordinantis aliquid
in finem").
78 Id. at I-II, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3. "The motion of the will moved to the end, insofar as the
end is acquired by means, is called 'intention."' ("Motus autem voluntatis qui fertur in
finem, secundum quod acquiritur per ea quae sunt ad finem, vocatur intentio").
79 Id. at I-I, q. 12, a. 2:
Intention refers to an end as a terminus of the motion of the will. In motions,
however, "terminus" can be understood in two ways: in one way, as the
ultimate terminus, in which the will is satisfied, the end of its entire motion; in
another way, terminus can be understood as a midpoint, which constitutes the
beginning of one part of the motion, and the end or terminus of another. Just
as in that motion by which one moves from A to C by means of B, C is a final
terminus, but B also is a terminus, but not a final one. And therefore there can
be an intention of either. Hence, intention is always of an end, but not
necessarily always of the ultimate end. ([Ilntentio respicit finem secundum
quod est terminus motus voluntatis. In motu autem potest accipi terminus
dupliciter: uno modo, ipse terminus ultimus, in quo quiescitur, qui est
terminus totius motus; alio modo, aliquod medium, quod est principium unius
partis motus, et finis vel terminus alterius. Sicut in motu quo itur de A in C
per B, C est terminus ultimus, B autem est terminus, sed non ultimus. Et
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Thomas with a useful model for cascading sequences of ends-
means relations; such a model unifies all subordinated 'objects' of
an intended end under a single intention, and yet,
simultaneously accounts for how an agent possesses rational and
volitional power to order each segment of that volitional chain.
3. Electio or 'Choice'
Electio, or 'choice,' is employed by Thomas to refer to an
actuality of the will not simply as inclining to an end as to be
acquired through some means, but, more specifically, as the
activity of will actually fixing the particular means to be
employed in attaining that end. Electio thus differs from
intentio, as Thomas understands it, because intention refers to a
mere inclination of the will to an end as to be acquired by some
yet to be determined means; whereas electio refers to that act of
will selecting out from various instrumental options the specific
object by which one attempts to attain that end.8 0 As Aquinas
observes, "a sign of which is... the fact that an agent can intend
the end before the means have been determined, which is proper
to choice."81
Just as means become intelligible only by virtue of an
antecedent intention for an end; so too choice presupposes an
intention for an end. Unless an actor had a preceding inclination
to attain an end through some means, he would have no basis for
moving himself to the process of determining and selecting any
particular one. Choice, thus always occurs within the context of
a broader and preexisting 'intentional' inclination to acquire an
end through some means.
In considering more specifically the nature of the selection
proper to choice, Thomas notes, however, that not just any
selection of a particular instrumental object involved in attaining
an end counts as a choice. For if so, electio could be attributed to
utriusque potest esse intentio. Unde etsi semper sit finis, non tamen oportet
quod semper sit ultimi finis.)
80 Id. at I-II, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3. "Thus, that act by which the will tends to something
propsed by reason, being ordained to an end by reason, is materially an act of the will, but
formally an act of reason." ("Sic igitur inquantum motus voluntatis fertur in id quod est
ad finem, prout ordinantur ad finem, est electio. Motus autem volutatis qui fertur in
finem, secundum quod acquiritur per ea quae sunt ad finem, vocatur intentio").
81 Id. at I-II, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3. "Cuius signum est quod intentio finis esse potest, etiam
nondum determinatis his quae sunt ad finem, quorum est electio."
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a lion's stalking one kind of prey instead of another, or to a bird's
snatching one kind of grass as food instead of another.82 For
Aquinas, choice refers to a particular mode of appetitive
inclination. It tends toward one object rather than another, that
is, as consciously preferred over others. In other words, election
denotes an intrinsically conscious preferential selection of an
object from out of a set of possible objects, all of which have been
judged, in one way or another, as attractive means rationally
ordered to a desired end.
In the examples from natural science, the desires of brute
animals are determined to uniform particular objects by instinct;
hence there is no choice in the full sense. In the case of human
actions, however, the preference of one alternative over another
is not always determined by instinct or nature but depends upon
the exercise of a discretionary activity selecting one possible
object from among others.8 3
Drawing upon Aristotle's view,84 Thomas describes 'choice as
'desiring intellect' (appetitivus intellectus) or 'intellective desire'
(appetitus intellectivus). He intends thereby to capture the unity
82 Id. at I-I, q. 13, a. 2, obj. 2. "But brute animals take one thing instead of another."
("Sed bruta animalia accipiunt aliquid prae aliis").
83 Aquinas states:
Since choice is a preference of one with respect to another, it is necessary that
choice be exercised with respect to a multiplicity of objects which could be
chosen. Therefore in those situations where the means are determined to one,
choice does not occur. But there is a difference between sense appetite and the
will ... because sense appetite is determined by the order of nature to one
determinate object. But the will, while being determined to something general
by nature, namely the good, is indeterminately related to particular goods. And
hence it is proper to the will to choose." "[C]um electio sit praeacceptio unius
respectu alterius, necesse est quod electio sit respectu plurium quae eligi
possunt. Et ideo in his quae sunt penitus determinata ad unum, electio locum
non habet. Est autem differentia inter appetitum sensitivum et voluntatem,
quia... appetitus sensitivus est determinatus ad unum aliquid particulare
secundum ordinem naturae; voluntas autem est quidem secundum naturae
ordinem, determinata ad unum commune, quod est bonum, sed indeterminate
se habet respectu particularium bonorum. Et ideo proprie voluntatis est
eligere.
Id. at I-II, q. 13, a. 2.
84 Aristotle's conception of choice is elaborated most fully in Book VI, 2, of the
Nichomachean Ethics. Aristotle explains that choice is a particular form of "desiring
thought" or "thinking desire" which must be supported and directed by preceding acts of
intellect and moral dispositions.
'Choice' is defined as the desire of deliberated means: "Choice will be deliberate desire of
things in our power." ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS III, 3, 1113all (H. Rackham
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1975) (1926). But this deliberative process can only be carried
out in virtue of possibilities conducive to one's wish for the end. And wish or end in turn is
constituted by virtue of particular moral characters. Cf. id. at III, 4.
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of rational and volitional characteristics present in acts of
willing. Willing represents not just a blind reaching out to
objects that appeal at a sensitive level of pleasure or pain, but
moves toward objects precisely insofar as they are grasped as
rationally pleasing, i.e., intelligibly good in some way.
Elaborating upon the interpenetration of intellect and will
present in choice, 85 Thomas proposes that when two principles
concur to produce a single result, one of those principles
functions as the formal element, and the other as the material
element. 86 Noting that the act of 'voluntas' requires a preceding
intellectual grasp of something constituting its formal 'end-
object,' Thomas proposes that electio, though "materially" an act
of the will, directly bears on some cognitively grasped good as its
formal 'means-object.' 87
Analyzing more deeply this formal rationality in choice,
Thomas states that choice follows a judgment or 'sentence' of
reason:88 "Choice follows the sentence or judgment, which is as it
were a conclusion of a practical syllogism. Hence that falls under
choice, which is related to practical syllogisms as a conclusion." 89
85 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I-II, q. 13, a. 1. "In the concept of choice is implied
something pertaining to reason or intellect, and something pertaining to the will." ("[I]n
nomine electionis importatur aliquid pertinens ad rationem sive intellectum, et aliquid
pertinens ad voluntatem.")
86 The contrast between the 'formal' and 'material' aspects refers back to the example
provided by Aristotle of a discussion of the unity of the shape given a piece of wax (the
formal element) and the substrate that provides the foundation for receiving and being
"formed" (the material element). See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA III (D. W. Hamlyn
trans., Clarendon Press 1993) (1968).
87 Yet, though directed toward this object rationally grasped as a means, electio
remains "substantially" and "materially" an act of the will because it principally includes
reference to appetitive motion toward a rationally ordered means. SUMMA THEO., supra
note 66, at I-II, q. 13, a. 1. "Thus, that act by which the will tends to something propsed
by reason, being ordained to an end by reason, is materially an act of the will, but
formally an act of reason." ("Sic igitur ille actus quo voluntas tendit in aliquid quod
proponitur ut bonum, ex eo quod per rationem est ordinatum ad finem, materialiter
quidem est voluntatis, formaliter autem rationis.")
88 Id. at I-II, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2. "It should be said that the conclusion of the syllogism
found in practical matters pertains to reason and is referred to as a 'sentence' or
'judgment,' which choice follows. Thus, such a conclusion can be understood to pertain to
choice, insofar as a choice follows it." ("Dicendum quod conclusio etiam syllogismi qui fit
in operabilibus, ad rationem pertinet et dicitur sententia vel iudicium, quam sequitur
electio. Et ab hoc ipsa conclusio pertinere videtur ad electionem, tanquam ad consequens."
89 Id. at I-II, q. 13, a. 3. "Electio consequitur sententiam vel iudicium, quod est sicut
conclusio syllogismi operativi. Unde illud cadit sub electione, quod se habet ut conclusio in
syllogismo operabilium."
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Relying again on Aristotle, 90 Aquinas here employs a comparison
between practical reasoning (reasoning about action), and
syllogistic, deductive reasoning. He observes, "reason directs
human action by two sorts of knowlege: according to universal
and particular knowledge. Thus, a person considering practical
action employs a type of syllogism whose conclusion is judgment
or choice or action."91
Aquinas illustrates this model with the following example: an
actor possesses a 'universal' general bel.ief that "[n]o fornication
is to be committed," yet, he is presented with a situation in which
there is a temptation to act contrary to that belief.92 Whether the
actor does so, according to Aquinas, depends in some way upon
the particular premise the actor brings to bear in his practical
deliberations, that is, how he experientially grasps the particular
90 Aristotle explicitly treats of how action or movement follows thought. He does so by
analogizing how conclusions are reached by theoretical reasoning to how actions are
reached by practical reasoning:
But how is it that thought is sometimes followed by action, sometimes not;
sometimes by movement, sometimes not? What happens seems parallel to the
case of thinking and inferring about the immovable objects. There the end is
the truth seen (for, when one thinks the two propositions, one thinks and puts
together the conclusion), but here the two propositions result in a conclusion
which is an action-for example, whenever one thinks that every man ought to
walk, and that one is a man oneself, straightway one walks; or that, in this
case, no man should walk, one is a man: straightway one remains at rest. And
one so acts in the two cases provided there is nothing to compel or prevent.
DE MOTU ANIMALIUM, VII, 701a5-16. Commenting on this text, David Wiggins explains
Aristotle's conception of the practical syllogism in the following manner: "Practical
syllogisms offer explanations of actions. These explanations ... reconstruct the reasons
an agent himself has for his action. They usually comprise a major and minor premise.
The first or major premise mentions something of which there could be a desire (orexis)
transmissible to some practical conclusion (that is, a desire convertible via some available
minor premise into action). The second or minor premise details a circumstance
pertaining to the feasibility in the particular situation of what must be done if the claim
of the major premise is to be heeded .... What matters for present purposes is that agents
can see in the truth of the minor premise a way of ministering to some concern to which
the major affords expression, and that their seeing this explains what they do." DAVID
WIGGINS, Weakness of Will, Commensurability and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire,
in NEEDS. VALUES, TRUTH: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE 239, 248 (Clarendon
Press, 3d. ed. 1998) (1987).
For more extended discussion of Aristotle's use of the "practical" syllogism, see D.J. Allan,
The Practical Syllogism, in AUTOUR D'ARISTOTE 325-40 (Publications Universitaires de
Louvain 1955); TAKATURA ANDO, ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF PRACTICAL COGNITION 214-65
(3d ed. 1971); and Martha Craven Nussbaum, Aristotle's 'De Motu Animalium; text,
translation, and interpretative essays, (Princeton Univ. Press, 1978) 174-75, 187, 190,
207.
91 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I-II, q. 76, a. 1. "Considerandum est autem quod
ratio secundum duplicem scientiam est humanorum actuum directiva: scilicet secundum
scientiam univeralem, et particularem. Conferens enim de agendis, utitur quodam
syllogismo cuius conclusio est iudicium seu electio vel operatio."
92 Id. at I-II, q. 77, a. 2, ad 4.
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concrete circumstances before him. As long as the actor judges
the particular act before him as, 'this act is fornication,' the actor
stands by the appropriate 'conclusion' about what to do, that is,
'this act of fornication is not to be committed.' 93 If, however, the
actor instead judges the particular occasion before him as an
instance of a different value, as for example, 'this act is
pleasurable,' then nothing prevents the actor from choosing in
conformity with the judgment that 'this pleasurable act is to be
pursued.' 94
The difficulty raised by the 'practical syllogism' analogy,
however, is that it fails to resolve the question of how the actor is
related to the possibility of drawing these different "conclusions"
and how he can remain free if choice must 'follow' one 'sentence'
of reason (similar to its usage in legal contexts) or another. In
fact, suggesting that choice follows practical reason as
conclusions follow premises in syllogistic reasoning suggests a
deterministic view of practical reason and choice.
Cognizant of this difficulty, Aquinas considers the objection
that if choice follows reason, choice cannot be free because
conclusions of reason follow necessarily from premises. 95
Responding, Thomas states that conclusions of practical
reasoning bear on contingent events which might be brought
about by action. He observes without further elaboration, "[b]ut
in such matters, conclusions are not derived from absolutely
necessary principles but only conditionally necessary principles,
as for example, 'if he runs, he moves."' 96
Aquinas's response, however, is unclear. From one
perspective, rather than resolving the objection, it could be read
to confirm it. If choice is contingent upon judgments, and choices
could be different if the conclusion reached by reason had been
different, then an agent could only hypothetically choose
93 Id. (concluding "no fornication is to be committed."-"nullam fornicationem esse
com mittendam").
94 Id. (concluding "pleasure is to be pursued"-"delectationem esse sectandam').
95 Id .at I-II, q. 13, a. 6, obj. 2. "Choice follows the judgment of reason about things to
be done. But reason judges with necessity in view of necessary premisses. Therefore, it
appears that choice also follows necessarily." ("[Ellectio consequitur iudicium rationis de
agendis. Sed ratio ex necessiate iudicat de aliquibus, propter necessitatem praemissarum.
Ergo videtur quod etiam electio ex necessitatae sequatur").
96 Id. at I-II, q. 13, a. 6, ad 2. "Dicendum quod sententia sive iudicium rationis de
rebus agendis est circa contingentia, quae a nobis fieri possunt: in quibus conclusiones
non ex necessitate sequuntur ex principiis necessariis absoluta necessitate, sed
necessariis solum ex conditione, ut, si currit, movetur." (internal quotations ommitted).
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otherwise, that is, if and only if the agent had drawn some other
practical conclusion. But since conclusions on a syllogistic model
follow with necessity from premises, this interpretation, as
explained,97 entails a psychological determinism ultimately
excluding any real notion of free choice. 98 If choice is determined
by judgments of reason in this way, Aquinas's position would
offer an account of free choice differing little from that "bait and
switch" counterfactual sense rejected above in discussion of
'caused freedom.' 99
On the other hand, Thomas may have something else in mind
when he suggests that the very premises of practical reason are
only conditionally necessary. Resolution of this ambiguous
response, in fact, demands further consideration of Aquinas's
understanding of the nature of practical 'deliberation' or
'consilium.' Although explicitly turning to discuss this
intellectual activity only after his treatment of election, Aquinas
is clear that practical reasoning precedes election.100
The question of free choice, as an act of rational appetite, then,
ultimately leads Thomas to focus upon those cognitive conditions
upon which choice depends. Only in these discussions does
Aquinas finally clarify what it means for him to speak of choice
'following' ('sequitur' or 'consequitur') judgments of reason, and
how freedom of choice is possible because judgments are only
"conditionally necessary." And in so doing, Thomas recognizes
that accounting for the possibility of free choice in a strong sense
demands a unique theory of practical rationality, i.e., it requires
development of a "radical" theory of practical reason, in which
97 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (determining "responsibility is an
illusion and the moral life as traditionally conceived a charade").
98 As Ronald Allen has recently described this view in the context of Fifth
Amendment Miranda Rights:
If choices are made for reasons, those reasons determine the choices, and thus
a choice is free only if the reasons are not themselves determined. Reasons, in
turn, are either held for prior reasons or not. And so on in an infinite regress. If
the regress leads back to nowhere but prior reasons, then obviously our choices
are determined by those prior reasons.
Allen, supra note 4, 76-77. If every choice is determined by a preceding judgment of
reason, then there is no free choice about what the judgment of reason will be, for that
choice would be predetermined by reason, Thus, no choice would be free, but always
intellectually determined by a preceding judgment, etc., ad infinitum.
99 See supra Part I(B)(1) ('caused freedom' advocates offer "explanation of at least one
sense that the agent conditionally could have acted otherwise").
100 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I-II, q. 14. "Of Counsel, Which Precedes Choice."
For further discussion of Aquinas's odd reverse ordering see infra note 146.
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alone-as was suggested by Susan Wolf-any valid model of
human autonomy would have to be grounded.
C. The Relation between Acts of Intellect and Acts of Will
In response to the objection that the human will is necessitated
to its choices by judgments of reason, Thomas takes up for
consideration the relations that exist between various types of
intellectual acts and corresponding will acts. Although in his
Summa Theologiae analysis, he addresses first the acts of will
already discussed-'voluntas,' 'intentio,' and 'electio'-in the
course of these considerations he frequently references various
intellectual acts presupposed by these acts of will.
In fact, from his very earliest discussions, Aquinas affirms that
every volitional act must be preceded by some intellectual
operation, "[e]very act of will is preceded by some act of intellect,
though a particular act of will may be prior to some particular act
of the intellect."101 Summarizing his general view on the relation
between cognitional and volitional acts, Thomas states, "[i]n the
order of things to be done, it is first necessary to assume an
apprehension of the end, then an appetite of the end; then it is
necessary to assume deliberation concerning the means to the
end, and then the appetite of things conducive to the end." 0 2
In view of the will's character as rational appetite, it is
impossible for Aquinas to envision any volitional act lacking an
object presented by reason. This, however, in no way implies
that volition is to be identified with or reduced to a form of
intellection. While every will-act must have some cognitive
'formality,' that formality alone does not exhaust the concept of
willing. Volition, in its various forms, refers not simply to a
cognitional activity, but primarily to an agent's inclination to a
rationally grasped good.
1. Exercise and Specification of Volitional Acts
In developing further his understanding of the mutual
dependency of intellect and will in volition, Thomas explains
101 Id. at I-II, q. 4, a. 4, ad 2. "[O]mnis actus voluntatis praeceditur ab aliquo actu
intellectus: aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est prior quam aliquis actus intellectus."
102 Id. at I-II, q. 15, a. 3. "In ordine autem agibilium, primo quidem oportet sumere
apprehensionem finis; deinde appetitum finis; deinde consilium de his quae sunt ad
finem; deinde appetitum eorum quae sunt ad finem."
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various senses in which the will can be understood to move from
merely potential to active inclination. Taking up the question of
whether the intellect moves the will to its operation,103-a
question obviously relevant to the understanding of how choice
'follows' reason-Thomas introduces a pivotal distinction
between the exercise and specification of acts. 104
Illustrating this distinction with reference to the 'power' of
sight, Aquinas states that the visual power may be understood to
be exercised depending simply upon whether a person is 'seeing'
or 'not seeing', that is, upon whether or not a person's visual
sense is activated or not. At the same time, 'sight' may also be
understood to be in potentiality ("in potency") to its being
exercised with respect to one specific formality or another, that
is, it may 'see' one colored object rather than another; as for
example, seeing a blue sky differs from seeing a starry sky.
'Seeing,' then, is understood by Thomas to be a unified cognitive
activity. It is constituted through the concurrence of two
actualities: one imparted by the agent (insofar as it is the agent's
faculty of sight which is active), and the other imparted by the
object (insofar as one colored object rather than another formally
specifies the exercise of the faculty).
For Aquinas, every act of a human cognitive or appetitive
faculty demands this synthesis of a subjective (material) and
objective (formal) element, and only when taken together, do they
provide a sufficient explanation for the occurrence of the
action. 105 The first sense of potentiality, the exercise, refers
primarily to the agent's contribution by means of the activity of
the subject's faculty; the second sense of potentiality refers
especially to the object 'determining' or 'specifying' the formal
103 Id. at I-II, q. 9, a. 1. "Of That Which Moves the Will." Id.
104 Id. at I-1I, q. 9, a. 1. "A power of the soul can be understood to be in potency to
different things in two ways: in one way, insofar as it is active or not active; in another,
insofar as it is active in one way or another." ("Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae
invenitur esse in potentia ad diversa: uno modo, quantum ad agere et non agere; alio
modo, quantum ad agere hoc vel illud").
105 Aquinas, for example, describes the process of knowledge as arising from a
synthetic unity between the intellect and the intelligible formalities of things known:
'With respect to the human intellect, the similitude the thing understood is different from
the substance of the intellectual power itself and functions as its form; thus out of the
intellect itself and the similitude there arises a single whole, namely, the intellect
actually understanding." ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, IN II SENTENTIARUM, d. 3, q., 3, a. 1, co.
[hereinafter IN II SENT] ("In intellectu vero humano similitudo rei intellectae est aliud a
substantia intellectus, et est sicut forma ejus; unde ex intellectu et similitudine rei
efficitur unum completum, quod est intellectus in actu intelligens").
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character of that activity, that is, the content or object of the
exercised act. 106
The will, similar to any other 'power' or 'faculty' of a human
agent, must also be understood to be in potency or 'able to be
moved' from two different perspectives: first, with respect to its
exercise (insofar as it is or is not inclining toward some object);
and, second, with respect to its specification (insofar as it inclines
toward one object or another). For Thomas, however, this
specification of the will's exercise always requires a cognitive
apprehension of a good as its object; just as one cannot 'see'
without seeing something, so too one cannot 'will' without willing
something rationally understood as good.107
2. The Will's Self-Motion
Like all actions subject to deliberate human control, however,
movements of faculties involve an actor moving himself or herself
to the exercise of that faculty, as for example a person moves
himself to think about one topic rather than another, or to look at
one object rather than another. With respect to the will, Thomas
proposes generally that the 'exercise' of will acts, for instance
intentions or choices, requires that the will move itself to these
actions; that is, a person must volitionally move himself to intend
and choose.
In connection with this point, Aquinas clarifies how a power
can be understood to move itself without raising a bootstrapping
problem suggested by the idea of a something moving itself.10
Relating this issue back to the distinction between 'intention' and
'choice,' Thomas explains that the will is able to move itself in
one respect, for example, to a choice, only because the will is
106 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I-11, q. 9, a. 1. "The object moves, determining the
act, in the mode of a formal principle, by which in natural things an action is specified."
("[Olbiectum movet, determinando actum, ad modum principii formalis, a quo in rebus
naturalibus actio specificatur").
107 Id. at I-II, q. 13, a.l. Hence, Aquinas' description of election as involving
"materially" an act of will, but "formally" an act of intellect. See supra note 87.
108 Id. at I-I, q. 9, a. 3, obj. 1. "Everything in motion, insofar as it is such, is in act;
but insofar as it is being "moved," however, it is in potency, for 'motion is the act of a thing
in potency, insofar as it is such.' But such a thing is not in potency and act with respect to
the same thing. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move
itself." ("Omne enim movens, inquantum huiusmodi, est in actu, quod autem movetur, est
in potentia, nam motus est actus existentis in potentia inquantum huiusmodi. Sed non est
idem in potentia et in actu respectu eiusdem. Ergo nihil movet seipsum. Neque ergo
voluntas seipsam movere potest").
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already actualized in another respect, for example, intending an
end. The will, then, is already in act insofar as it is inclined to an
end by intention, but it is still in potency with respect to willing a
means to that end. Accordingly, the will's self-movement to the
'exercise' of a choice is made possible precisely through the
preexisting dynamism imparted to the will through its intention
of an end, and thus involves no incoherent contradiction. 10 9
Of course, the initial intention, as an exercise of will, must
itself have a specifying object. As Aquinas argues, agents can
move themselves to action only by virtue of a preceding motion
toward some end or object.110 Relying on the distinction between
the exercise and the specification of will acts, Thomas observes
that whenever the will moves itself to an act, as for instance
when it moves itself from an intention to a choice, it also requires
a specifying object for that new movement.
Delving more deeply into analysis of the transition from
intention to choice, Aquinas points out that an actor cannot
transition directly from one to the other. Prior to choosing a
means, the will, by virtue of the intended end, first must move
the intellect to its operation, i.e., to deliberate or take counsel
about what rational means may be available for choice."'
Without the will's movement of the intellect, directing the mind
109 Id. at I-II, q. 9, a. 3, ad 1. "It should be said that it is not in the same respect that
the will 'moves' and 'is moved.' Hence, the will is not in act and in potency in the same
way. But insofar as it actively wills an end, it moves itself from potency to act with
respect to the means, that is, so as to actually will them." ("Dicendum quod voluntas non
secundum idem movet et movetur. Unde nec secundum idem est in actu et in potentia.
Sed inquantum actu vult finem, reducit se de potentia in actum respectu eorum quae sunt
ad finem, ut scilicet actu ea velit.") See AQUINAS, DE MALO, supra note 68, q. 6, corp: "Nor
does it follow the the will is both in potency and act in the same way.... Rather, by
actually willing one thing, a man moves himself to actually willing something else." ("Nec
propter hoc sequitur quod voluntas secundum idem sit in potentia et in actu.... [P]er hoc
quod homo aliquid vult in actu, movet se ad volendum aliquid aliud in actu").
110 Id. at I-II, q. 9, a. 4. "Everything that is sometimes in act and sometimes in
potency needs to be moved by a moving thing. It is obvious, however, that the will
sometimes begins to will something that is did not will before. It is necessary, therefore,
that something moves it to this act of willing. And therefore ... it moves itself, insofar as
by willing an end, it moves itself to willing means to the end. ("Omne enim quod
quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia, indiget moveri ab aliquo movente.
Manifestum est autem quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non vellet.
Necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum. Et quidem ... ipsa movet
seipsam, inquantum per hoc quod vult finem, reducit seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt
ad finem").
111 Id. "But this cannot occur without intervening acts of counsel." ("Hoc autem non
potest facere nisi consilio mediante").
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to take counsel about means, no objects could be conceived that
provides a specification for an act of choice.
Providing an example from medicine, Thomas notes that only
when a sick person intends health as an end does she begin to
deliberate about various means by which health might be
achieved. In turn, only once deliberation hits upon various
possible means to health, such as treatment by a physician or the
taking of a potion, can the will move itself to the exercise of
choosing from among these possibilities.112 Thus, intention of an
end accounts for both the will's movement of the intellect
(reasoning about the means) and the will's subsequent self-
movement to choice (selecting a means).
D. The Root of Freedom is in Reason1 13
1. The Problem of Infinite Regress
A difficulty, however, raised by this preceding discussion, and
which Aquinas is well aware of, is the potentially infinite
regression suggested by the relation between the acts of intellect
and will. As explained above, Aquinas argues that the will, as a
'rational' appetite, requires for its exercise the presence of a
cognitively grasped good that provides the specifying object of
that exercise. If, however, in order to grasp a cognitive good, the
intellect always requires a prior motion of the will moving the
intellect to that act of thinking, then the process becomes
incoherent. As Aquinas describes the problem: "[wie can will
112 Id. "When someone wants to be healed, he begins to think about how this can be
brought about, and by such deliberation he arrives at the fact that he can be healed by a
doctor, and then wills this. " ("[C]um enim aliquis vult sanari, incipit cogitare quomodo
hoc consequi possit, et per talem cogitationem pervenit ad hoc quod potest sanari per
medicum, et hoc vult"); see DE MALO, supra note 68, at q. 6. PROLOGUS, corpus: "Just as by
means of willing health, a person moves himself to ingest a potion: from the willing of
health, he deliberates about things conducive to health, and once having determined that,
wills to take the potion. Therefore, deliberation precedes the willing of the the potion's
ingestion, which deliberation itself arises by the will of one willing to deliberate." ("Sicut
per hoc quod vult sanitatem, movet se ad volendum sumere potionem: ex hoc quod vult
sanitatem, incipit consiliari de his quae conferunt ad sanitatem: et tandem determinato
consilio vult accipere potionem. Sic ergo voluntatem accipiendi potionem praecedit
consilium, quod quidem procedit ex voluntate volentis consiliari").
113 "The root of all freedom is constituted in reason. Hence insofar a thing is related
to reason, so is it related to free choice." ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ON TRUTH ("QUAESTIONES
DISPUTATAE DE VERITATE") q. 24. a. 2. (Fathers of English Dominican Province trans.)
[hereinafter DE VERIT]. "[Tiotius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta. Unde
secundum quod aliquid se habet ad rationem, sic se habet ad liberum arbitrium."
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nothing unless it be understood. But, if in order to understand,
the will must move the intellect to an act of understanding, it is
necessary that this act of will itself be preceded by some act of
understanding, and that understanding in turn by some prior act
of willing, and so on ad infinitum."114 If every motion of intellect
requires a preceding motion of will, and if every act of will
requires a preceding motion of intellect, there could be no will or
intellectual acts at all.l"5
2. The First Cognition of Practical Reason
In response to this regress problem, Thomas proposes that
while every act of will must be preceded by some intellectual
apprehension of good, not every intellectual apprehension of good
requires the will's preceding movement of the intellect.11 6 The
possibility of infinite regress is resolved, according to Thomas,
because all human volitional acts are ultimately traceable to
some first, fundamental cognitive act of understanding that
requires no movement of the intellect by the will.1l 7
Thomas, at various times in the body of his writings, refers to
this original practical knowledge presupposing no movement of
the will as 'synderesis.' In his Commentary on the Sentences, for
example, he notes that all motion must begin from some
unmoved mover. Analyzing the process of reasoning as a type of
motion, (e.g., the movement from premises to conclusions)
Thomas concludes that both in theoretical and practical
reasoning, there must be some first, inchoate cognition that
114 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I, q. 82, a. 4, obj. 3. "Nihil velle possumus nisi sit
intellectum. Si igitur ad intelligendum movet voluntas volendo intelligere, oportebit quod
etiam illud velle praecedat aliud intelligere, et illud intelligere aliud velle, et sic in
infinitum: quod est impossibile. Non ergo movet intellectum."
115 Id. at I-Il, q. 17, a. 1. This mutual influence of will and intellect and the possibility
of each being preceded by an act of the other is described by Thomas as follows: "Acts of
will and reason can refer to each other, insofar as reason can reason about willing, and
the will can will to reason: thus an act of will can be preceded by an act of reason and the
opposite." ("Actus voluntatis et rationis supra se invicem possunt ferri, prout scilicet ratio
ratiocinatur de volendo, et voluntas vult ratiocinari: contingit actum voluntatis praeveniri
ab actu rationis, et e converso").
116 See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
117 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I, q. 82, a. 4, obj. 3. "It must be said that this
cannot proceed to infinity, but stops at the intellect in the first instance. For it is
necessary that an apprehension precede every motion of the will; but a motion of the will
does not precede every apprehension." ("Dicendum quod non oportet procedere in
infinitum, sed statur in intellectu sicut in primo. Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse
est quod praecedat apprehensio: sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedit motus
voluntatis").
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provides a foundation for all subsequent intellectual acts. These
primal cognitions, then, cannot themselves be the product of
discursive investigation. (Such a view would inevitably require
positing preceding acts of will moving the intellect to arrive at
those results.) Instead, such basic forms of knowledge must in
some way be immediately accessible to the human intellect and
not the result of discursive reasoning.11 8
Discussing this knowledge with respect to practical reasoning,
Aquinas states: "As 'being' is the first thing that falls under
apprehension absolutely, so 'good' is the first thing that falls
['cadit'] under apprehension of practical reason, which is directed
to actions."11 9
Here, Aquinas's utilization of the term 'cadit' or 'falls' is not
accidental. It emphasizes the spontaneity with which the
apprehension of 'good' is engendered in the mind and the absence
of any need for preceding acts of will that 'move' the intellect to
attain that cognition. The first starting point of practical
reasoning, that is, reasoning about what to do, then, begins with
an intuitive notion of 'good,' attained spontaneously or naturally
and without discursive activity. Thomas reiterates this stating
that such understanding results immediately in the human mind
from the natural light of reason itself: "Synderesis ... is in a
118 "1 respond that just as in the case of natural things, every motion must begin with
some unmoved mover ... and so too in the process of reasoning because reason has a
certain variation and in is a type of motion insofar as conclusions are drawn from
premises. Hence it is necessary that every act of reasoning proceed from some knowledge,
which knowledge must have a certain uniformity and stability, and cannot result from
discursive investigation but is immediately offered to the intellect." IN II SENT., supra
note 105, d. 24, q., 2, a. 3. ("Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut est de motu rerum
naturalium, quod omnis motus ab immobili movente procedit,... ita etiam oportet quod
sit in processu rationis; cum enim ratio varitatem quamdam habeat, et quodammodo
mobilis sit, secundum quod principia in conclusiones deducit... oportet quod omnis
ratione ab aliqua cognitione procedat, quae uniformitatem et quietem quamdam habeat:
quod non fit per discursum investigationis, sed subito intellectui offertur"). "Hence in
human nature.., there must be a knowledge of truth without inquisition in both
speculative and practical matters, and indeed this cognition must be the priciple of all
knowledge that follows, whether speculative or practical .... Accordingly this knowledge
must be found in the human person naturally, and the person knows by it as if it were a
"nursery" of all subsequent knowledge." DE VERIT, supra note 113, at q. 16, a. 1 ("Unde et
in natura humana ... oportet esse cognitionem veritatis sine inquisitione et in
speculativis et in practicis; et hanc quidem cognitionem oportet esse principium totius
cognitionis sequentis, sive speculativae sive practicae, cum principia oporteat esse
stabiliora et certioria. Unde et hanc cognitionem oportet homini naturaliter inesse, cum
hoc quidem cognoscat quasi quoddam seminarium totius cognitionis sequentis"); see
SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I, q. 79, a. 12.
119 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I-I, q. 94, a. 2. "Sicut autem ens est primum
quod cadit in apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit in
apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus ...
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certain manner innately present in our minds and results from
the very light of the. . . intellect."120
3. The 'Universal Good'
Of course, such considerations offer little in terms of explaining
the functional significance of this first cognition of 'good.' Here
Aquinas' intended meaning is aided by consideration of an
analogy he provides elsewhere with respect the roll played by the
forms of 'factibilia' or 'things that can be made' in the arts and
crafts.
Considering the manner in which artists are able to create a
wide variety of objects through their conception of a single
exemplar, Aquinas observes that the intellectual concept of a
'wooden chest' or a 'house' made use of by an artist can be
instantiated in almost limitless variety. This is possible, he
argues, because the general conceptions in the artist's mind are
not subject to specific determinations beyond their most general
formal characteristics. Hence, there is nothing in the content of
exemplars that limits the artist to creating "any particular
concrete object or to any particular concrete mode of that object's
existence." 121 An artist, can build a house or not, and if he builds
a house, he can build one of any sort, size, shape and out of any
material he or she wishes.122
'Analogously, Aquinas envisions the first conception of 'good,'
innately present in the human mind, as a 'model' for all
subsequent reasoning about good. Drawing out this analogy,
Aquinas proposes that the first object of the practical intellect, as
the rational principle underlying all human choices, cannot be
indeterminate simply with respect to some particular or
individuating characteristics. The indeterminacy of this innate
notion of good must embrace the full range of all possible objects
that might be grasped as good in any way.
120 IN II SENT, supra note 105, at d. 24, q. 2, a. 3. ("[S]ynderesis... est quodammodo
innatus menti nostrae ex ipso lumine intellectus").
121 See DE VERIT, supra note 113, at q. 23, a. 1.
122 DE MALO, supra note 68, at q. 6. "[I]f an architect conceives the form of a house
universally, under which houses of different shapes are comprised, his will can be inclined
to build a house that is square or circular or of some other shape." ("Sicut si artifex
concipiat formam domus in universali sub qua comprehenduntur diversae figurae domus,
potest voluntas eius inclinari ad hoc quod faciat domum quadratam vel rotundam, vel
alterius figurae").
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Reiterating his understanding of rational 'good' as primarily
characterized by the notion end,123 Thomas holds that this first
cognition of practical reasoning is an intuitive apprehension of a
universal conception of being as 'good' or 'perfective of another as
end,' (universale bonum) open to every subsequent rational grasp
of particular goods: "[O]perations of human persons tend to any
type of good because good is understood universally; hence in
whatever degree goodness unfolds itself, so too extends human
understanding, and consequently, the will."124
4. The Universal Good as the Primary Object of Will
Corresponding to this original, innate grasp of 'universal good'
by intellect, Thomas posits a primary inclination of will
"informed" and specified by this conception. As he repeatedly
states: the most fundamental object of the will is the universal
good: "[e]very intellectual being is related to the universal good,
which it can apprehend and which is the object of the will."125
Again, "[h]uman appetite, which is the will, is of the universal
good."126
This, of course, is not surprising since by 'will' Aquinas
understands precisely that mode of desire attracted to objects as
rationally good. The will is the 'rational appetite' because it is
ordered to and inclines toward good-intellectually-apprehended,
123 DE VERIT, supra note 113, at q. 21, a. 2. ("The notion of good consists in being
perfective of another as an end. Everything that is found to have this notion of an end,
has also the notion of good." ("Ratio boni in hoc consistat quod aliquid sit perfectivum
alterius per modum finis, omne id quod invenitur habet rationem finis, habet et rationem
boni"); see supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of 'voluntas' or
'willing' as primarily directed to an end.
124 "Tendit autem operatio hominis in quodcumque bonum, quia universale bonum
est quod homo desiderat, cum per intellectum universale bonum apprehendat: unde ad
quemcumque gradum se porrigit bonum, aliqualiter extenditur operatio intellectus
humani, et per consequens voluntatis." ST THOMAS AQUINAS, COMP. THEO. BK II, ch. 9.
"The intellect apprehends good according to the universal notion of good." ("Nam
intellectus apprehendit bonum secundum universalem rationem boni"). ARISTOTLE, IN
LIBROS DE ANIMA II ET III Lect. 14, no. 10 (D. W. Hamlyn trans., Clarendon Press 1993).
125 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I, q. 63, a.4. "Quaelibet natura intellectualis
habet ordinem in bonum universale, quod potest apprehendere, et quod est obiectum
voluntatis."
126 Id. at I-II, q. 2, a. 7 "Appetitus autem humanus, qui est voluntas, est boni
universalis." See id. at I-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3: "The object of the will is the end and good in
universal." ("[Olbiectum voluntatis est finis et bonum in universali"). Id. at I-II, q. 2, a. 7
("Appetitus autem humanus, qui est voluntas, est boni universalis"); id. at I-I, q. 2, a. 8
("Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum"); DE
MALO, supra note 68, at q. 8, a. 3 ("Appetitus ergo rationalis, qui est voluntas, habet pro
propria ratione obiecti bonum universale").
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that is, the will finds objects attractive only insofar as they can
be grasped as rationally perfecting or fulfilling something. This
joint apprehension of and inclination to the bonum universale is
captured by Aquinas in his articulation of the first principle of
practical reason: "Good is to be done and pursued and evil
avoided."127
This conception of universal good and the natural inclination to
it, however, cannot itself be the object of a free choice. For, in
Aquinas's view human persons have no choice about these first
indeterminate orientations of the intellect and will. Thus,
Aquinas's resolution of the free will problem inevitably depends
upon his account of the transition from these innate, necessary
operations of intellect and will to concrete choices of determinate
goods.
5. Willing Other Goods
Explaining the transition from willing good universally (bonum
universale) to willing particular goods, Aquinas observes that the
will's inclination to 'good universally' does not limit it to inclining
only toward objects that perfect the will itself. Rather, just as the
first conception of 'good' provides a basis for an intellectual grasp
of all particular 'goods' in limitless variety, so too, the will's
inclination to bonum universale endows it with an indeterminate
dynamism capable of being directed to all objects so understood.
Of particular importance in this context, however, are certain
classes of goods corresponding to inclinations of the various
powers and faculties forming an intrinsic part of human persons'
constitution. 128 Thomas asserts that in light of the universal
conception of good, practical reason necessarily grasps the
general objects of these inclinations as perfective "ends." He
explains that, "[b]ecause 'good' has the notion of end, and evil the
notion of its contrary, everything toward which man has a
natural inclination, and thus which is grasped as perfective,
127 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I-II, q. 94, a. 2. "Bonum est faciendum et
prosequendum, et malum vitandum."
128 For example, inclinations to pursue sense knowledge, nutrition, reproduction,
community, intellectual knowledge, etc. See, e.g., id. at I-I, q. 94., a.2.
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reason "naturally" apprehends as a good and consequently to be
pursued, while opposites are grasped as evils to be avoided." 129
As a result, additional principles guiding human practical
reason come to be constituted. These intermediate principles
prescribe more specific, but not entirely determinate, general
goods or ends to which persons are naturally attracted:
Just as 'good' is the first thing that falls in the
apprehension of practical reason,... therefore the
first principle in practical reason is the first precept of
law, that is, that good is to be done and pursued and
evil avoided. And upon this is based all the other
precepts... i.e., those things are to be pursued or
avoided.., which practical reason naturally
apprehends as being human goods. Because good has
the character of an end and evil a contrary character,
hence everything a human person has a natural
inclination for, reason grasps as goods, and
consequently as to be pursued by action. 130
It is, in fact, these general principles of practical reason that
comprise, for Aquinas, the principles of the 'natural law." They
constitute the very starting points for rational deliberation about
how to fulfill one's capacities and needs as a human person, and
in turn, provide the foundation for determining all more specific
norms governing human choice. As Thomas states, "[i]t is from
129 Id. at I-I, q. 94, a.2. "Quia vero bonum habet rationem finis, malum autem
rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad quae homo habet natural inclinationem,
ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opera prosequenda, et
contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda." See id. at I-Il, q. 10, a.l. "The principle of voluntary
motions must be something willed naturally. This is the the good in general .... But by
the 'will' we will not only those things that pertain to the will itself, but also things which
pertain to the other individual faculties and the whole person. Hence a person naturally
wills not only the object of the will itself but all objects which correspond to the other
human faculties... and which are all understood to fall under the object of the will as
particular instances of 'goods."' ("[Pirincipium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid
naturaliter volitum. Hoc autem est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter
tendit .... Non enim per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam
voluntatis; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et ad totum hominem.
Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum obiectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae
conveniunt aliis potentiis... quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia
comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona").
130 Id. at I-II, q. 94, a. 2. "Sicut autem... bonum est primum quod cadit in
apprehensione practicae rationis .... [I]deo primum principium in ratione practica est...
primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum
vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta ... ut scilicet omnia illa facienda
vel vitanda pertineant ad praecepta... quae ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse
bona humana."
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the precepts of natural law, as if from general and
indemonstrable premises, that human reason must proceed to
determining matters more particularly. And these particular
dispositions, discovered by human reason, are called human
laws .... "131
Principles of "natural law" are most properly understood, then,
not as a set of abstractly deduced prohibitions, but as
spontaneously engendered general principles guiding practical
reason to choose instantiations of those basic types of goods that
fulfill human capacities and needs.132 As Thomas describes this,
"[h]uman reason itself is not the measure of all things; but by
means of principles impressed upon reason from nature, which
are the general rules and measures of the acts that are to be done
by man, natural reason is the measure of those acts (though
reason itself is not the measure of those things from nature
themselves.)" 133
In sum, taking the 'principium' or principle of practical reason
precisely in its etymological sense as 'a beginning,' Thomas
131 Id. at I-Il, q. 91, a. 3. "[E]x praeceptis legis naturalis, quasi ex quibusdam
principiis communibus et indemonstrabilibus, necesse est quod ratio humana procedat ad
aliqua magis particulariter disponenda. Et istae particulares dispositiones adinventae
secundum rationem humanam, dicuntur leges humanae, servatis aliis conditionibus quae
pertinent ad rationem legis."
132 Aquinas states that the obligation of law arises from its promulgation and
application to human persons. "A rule and measure is imposed by being applied to those
things which are ruled and measured. Hence, for law to obtain the power of obligation,
which is proper to law, it is necessary that it be applied to the human persons who are to
be ruled by it." ("Regula autem et mensura imponitur per hoc quod applicatur his quae
regulantur et mensurantur. Unde ad hoc quod lex virtutem obligandi obtineat, quod est
proprium legis, oportet quod applicetur hominibus qui secundum eam regulari debent").
Id. at I-II, q. 90, a. 4.
The principles of practical reason under consideration, however, direct human agents
generally to the most basic human goods. This is so, according to Aquinas, because they
are "impressed upon reason from nature" and are "general rules and measures of all acts
that are to be done by man." See infra note 133 and accompanying text. Because,
however, human persons are not the "measure of those things themselves that are from
nature," these general inclinations inherent in a human person's constitution are
unavoidably grasped as necessarily perfective. Id. Accordingly, these "unavoidable"
general prescriptions of practical reason, by which human persons seek fulfillment in
basic human goods, are experienced by man as "obligations" and in that sense form a type
of "law."
133 Id. at I-II, 91, 3, ad 2. "Ratio humana secundum se non est regula rerum, sed
principia ei naturaliter indita, sunt quaedam regulae generales et mensurae omnium
eorum quae sunt per hominem agenda, quorum ratio naturalis est regula et mensura,
licet non sit mensura eorum quae sunt a natura."
These basic principles then are the fundamental principles that make the choice of
human goods possible at all; they provide the human mind with the possibility of grasping
such objects as perfective in the first place and thus as ends that can be rationally
appreciated.
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proposes that the primary actualities of intellect and will make
possible all subsequent perceptions of particular goods and
exercises of will. By means of the intellect's universal conception
of good and the will's natural inclination to it, a human person is
endowed with a dynamism sufficient to know and will any type of
goodness, including one's own perfection, as well as the
perfection of other things, insofar as they can be intelligibly
related to other objects as ends or perfections.134 As Aquinas
states: "In those beings having 'will,' every faculty and habitual
actuality is brought to good action by means of the will; for the
will has as its object 'good taken universally,' under which are
contained all particular goods, and for the sake of which those
faculties and habits operate."135
E. The Meaning of Autonomy
Having concluded this broadbased elaboration of Aquinas's
account of human willing, it is finally possible to consider its
relation to the general problem of free will developed in prior
discussions.
1. Free Judgment
For Aquinas, the root of human freedom ultimately traces back
to the indeterminacy of practical reason's conception of 'universal
good,' and the will's foundational inclination to that same,
indeterminate universal good. Because of the will's inclination
(attraction to) the indeterminate bonum universale, not only is
the will able to take interest in all particular goods, but, at the
same, time, no particular object-which reflects only a restricted,
limited instantiation of goodness-can necessitate the will's
inclination to it. As Aquinas elucidates this point, "[tihe will is
not able to incline to anything except insofar as it is seen as good.
134 See Vernon J. Bourke, Human Tendencies, Will and Freedom, in L'HOMME ET SON
DESTIN, 79-81 (Nauwelaerts ed., Louvain 1960); cf. G. Verbeke, Le Dgvelopment de la Vie
Volitive D'aprds Saint Thomas, in REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE 56 (LOUVAIN ed., 1958).
135 DE MALO, supra note 68, at q. 1, a. 5. ("Manifestum est autem quod in habentibus
voluntatem, per actum voluntatis quaelibet potentia et habitus in bonum actum
reducitur; quia voluntas habet pro obiecto universale bonum, sub quo continentur omnia
particularia bona, propter quae operantur potentiae et habitus quaecumque").
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But because good is manifold [multiplex], the will is therefore not
determined to one thing."136
Discussion of the exemplars in the minds of artisans is again
useful for illustrating how 'intellectually understood objects'
cannot function as objects determining the movement of appetite.
Contemplating the possibility of building a "house," i.e., a
dwelling fit for human habitation, an artisan may appreciate the
appealing qualities and usefulness of many different
architectural styles and structures. Each in its own way could be
understood to satisfy diverse aesthetic, social, and environmental
demands. Accordingly, none of the conceived structures would
necessitate an artisan's choice to build one rather than the other,
or even to build any house at all. Because of the very
indeterminacy of the conception, it compels no choice.
For Thomas, this indeterminacy of universal forms constitutes
the condition for intellectual and volitional freedom. As he
explains: "the form intellectually grasped is universal, under
which many can be comprehended. Since acts are concerned
with singulars, among which there is none that is equal to the
potentiality of the universal, the inclination of the will remains
indeterminately related to many."137
Any particular, limited conception of a concrete good, then,
represents only one of myriad possibilities that can be grasped as
"good" in light of the bonum universale. Hence, nothing in the
understanding of a particularized instance of good corresponds
even remotely to the fullness of the conception of bonum
universale itself, and accordingly, falls short of corresponding to
will's necessary attraction to the universal good. Given the
limited nature of every particular good when contrasted with the
universal notions of good possessed by practical reason, no single
judgment of a particular good can necessitate the will.138
136 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I, q. 82, a. 2, ad 1. "Dicendum quod voluntas in
nihil potest tendere nisi sub ratione boni. Sed quia bonum est multiplex, propter hoc non
ex necessitate determinatur ad unum."
137 DE MALO, supra note 68, at q. 6: "Forma intellecta est universalis sub qua multa
possunt comprehendi; unde cum actus sint in singularibus, in quibus nullum est quod
adaequet potentiam universalis, remanet inclinatio voluntatis indeterminate se habens
ad multa."
138 "For Aquinas, then, the intellect's work is not sufficient to determine the will's
choice." Patrick Lee, The Relation between Intellect and Will in Free Choice according to
Aquinas and Scotus, 49 THE THOMIST 321, 336 (1985).
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Of course, consistent with this argument, Aquinas affirms that
if an object could be presented that was good in every way
conceivable-that is, an actual object corresponding to the
conception of bonum universale-it would necessitate the will to
choose it.139 Any particular concrete good available to human
persons in this life, however, falls short of such goodness. While
specific goods may, in one way or another, be rationally attractive
to the agent, it is always possible for the agent to focus on some
aspect of that good that is lacking and hence not choose it: "In all
particular goods, it is possible to consider the notion of a
particular good, and the absence of a particular good (which has
the notion of an evil); in this way, everyone of these types of
goods can be apprehended as worthy of choice or to be
avoided."14 0
By specifying the exercise of one's will toward particular ends
in view of the ultimate conception of bonum universale, the will
possesses the actuality necessary to move itself to deliberation
concerning a multiplicity of possible objects in which the ratio of
good might be found. In the course of deliberating, the agent is
able to appreciate a variety of objects which in unique manners
instantiate the conception of 'good.' And by virtue of the
intellectual reflection upon one's acts, the agent is able to
evaluate opposing practical judgments, weighing and comparing
the alternative good offered by each. As Aquinas summarizes
this view:
I respond that the are some things that that do not act
from any judgment, but act and are moved by another,
as an arrow is moved to its target by an archer. Some
things, however, do indeed act from judgment, but not
139 [B]ecause the absence of any good has the ratio of not good, therefore that good
alone which is perfect and lacks nothing, is of such a character that the will cannot not
will it: ... All other particular goods, in as much as they lack some good, can be taken as
not good. And in reference to this consideration they can be repudiated and refused by the
will, which can be directed to the same thing according to different considerations. SUMMA
THEO., supra note 66, at I-II, q. 10, a. 2. "Et quia defectus cuiuscumque boni habet
rationem non boni, ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale
bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle: ... Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona,
inquantum deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona: et secundum hanc
considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in idem ferri
secundum diversas considerationes."
140 See id. at I-I, q. 13, a. 6. "[I]n omnibus particularibus bonis potest considerare
rationem boni alicuius, et defectum alicuius boni, quod habet rationem mali: et secundum
hoc potest unumquodque huisumodi bonorum apprehendere ut eligibile, vel fugibile.") Cf.
id. at I-I, q. 10, a. 2. & q. 13, a. 6, ad. 3; DE MALO, supra note 68, at q. 6, ad 7.
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free judgment; as irrational animals, for the sheep
flees the wolf from a certain type of judgment by
which it judges that the wolf is a threat to it. This
judgment, however, is not free but derived from
nature. Only a being having intellect can act from
free judgment, insofar as it understands the universal
conception of good, by which it is able to judge that
this thing or that is good. Hence where there is
intellectual understanding, there is free judgment.141
2. Free Choice
Thus, no particular good that human persons may
contemplate, nor any particularized standard of value employed
in judging one object better than another, can ever be anything
other than an imperfect approximation of the universal
conception of good. Given the matrix of imperfect rational goods
available to the will in the concrete world, the exercise of a choice
cannot be causally explained simply by appeal to the formation of
a practical judgment. Regardless of what judgments the intellect
forms, none compels the will to choose according to it, for none
corresponds to the fullness of that conception of 'good' toward
which alone the will necessarily inclines.
Accordingly, for Aquinas, the specification of choice through
judgments about good cannot cause choice efficiently or
necessarily.142 It is the inability of the mind to discover in any
141 Id. at I, q. 59, a. 3. "Respondeo dicendum quod quaedam sunt quae non agunt ex
aliquo arbitrio, sed quasi ab aiis acta et mota, sicut sagitta a sagittante movetur ad
finem. Quaedam vero agunt quodam arbitrio, sed non libero, sicut animalia irrationalia,
ovis enim fugit lupum ex quodam iudicio, quo existimat eum sibi noxium; sed hoc
iudicium non est sibi liberum, sed a natura inditum. Sed solum id quod habet intellectum,
potest agere iudicio libero, inquantum cognoscit universalem rationem boni, ex qua potest
iudicare hoc vel illud esse bonum. Unde ubicumque est intellectus, est liberum arbitrium."
142 As Mary T. Clark restates this position:
It is this indeterminacy on the part of the "good apprehended by the practical
reason" that prevents it from exercising anything other than formal causality,
which in the last work of St. Thomas on this subject is described as a mere
presence of an object in the practical reason. But in the metaphysical thought
of St. Thomas, formal causality is destitute of actuality or power without the
act of esse given by the efficient cause. The will is the efficient cause of the act
of choice that has power over the formal cause, because the will can move or
not move itself and can command all other faculties, including the practical
reason.
And so we see that although the will is specified by the object presented by the
practical reason, and so the reason can be said to move the intellect in the
order of specification, there is a very real sense in which the will moves itself in
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single object the fullness of universale bonum that opens the
possibility of freedom: "The root of all freedom is constituted in
reason." 143 By means of this indeterminacy, the will is free, first,
to direct reason to consider a multiplicity of possible goods and,
second, to choose according to whichever judgment of practical
reason it prefers.
In sum, a choice made under these conditions constitutes a
strong conception of freedom; it proposes that a sufficient causal
explanation of choice is found only in a particular type of self-
motion of the will, that is, a free self-motion of the will to one
good rather than another. This choice is indeed made possible
only by virtue of a prior intention, but that intention, rather than
determining choice, opens up multiple possibilities for the
specification of its exercise. Faced with these alternative means
to some intended end, the will must freely determine which
'judgment' or 'conclusion' of deliberation to bring before itself (by
moving the intellect to that consideration), and to choose in
accordance with it, thus constituting one judgment of good rather
than another as the specification of its choice.144 As Aquinas
succinctly states:
The potency of the will, in itself is indifferently related
to many things. But that the will determinately
exercises this act rather than that act is not
determined by anything else, but by the will itself...
the order of exercise .... This gives the will mastery over its own specification
with regard to means.
Mary T. Clark, Willing Freely According to Thomas Aquinas, in A STRAIGHT PATH:
STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE 49, 52-53 (Ruth Link-Salinger ed.,
Catholic Univ. Press 1988).
143 DE VERIT, supra note 113, q. 24. a. 2. "[T]otius libertatis radix est in ratione
constituta."
144 Patrick Lee notes the tendency to misconstrue the role of intellect as an efficiently
determining factor of action:
A very incautious dictum tossed about has been, "The intellect specifies the
will .... The common resort of the mutual causality of intellect and will does
not answer the problem raised by this passage. The problem is this: if the
intellect specifies that this object rather than that be willed, then the choice is
not free but intellectually determined. If the objection is stated in precisely this
way, I think it can be answered only by denying the antecedent. Yet Thomists
have often been loath to deny it, for fear of falling into 'voluntarism.'
Lee, supra note 136, at 321.
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And therefore, the most proper act of the will is said to
be from the will itself.145
Ultimately it remains up to the person himself through his
will, and nothing else, to determine which limited good he will
take as the object of practical reason and choice.
3. 'Following' Reason
Accordingly, when Thomas speaks of choice 'following'
('sequitur' or 'consequitur') reason, he cannot be understood to
assert that any particular rational grasp of good necessarily or
efficiently causes choice. Rather, he means that choice comes
after counsel and judgment, and that they function as necessary,
but not sufficient, conditions for the exercise of electio.146 Choice
"follows" reason because choice presupposes some intelligible
formal good functioning as its specification.
This non-causal understanding of the manner in which choice
'follows' reason is confirmed by Aquinas's analogy of choice to the
exercise of the power of vision.147 It is, after all, striking that
145 IN II SENT, supra note 105, d. 39, a. 1. "Ipsa enim potentia voluntatis, quantum in
se est, indifferens est ad plura; sed quod determinate exeat in hunc actum vel in illum
non est ab alio determinante, sed ab ipsa voluntate .... Et ideo propriissime actus
voluntatis a voluntate esse dicitur."
146 J.M. Ramirez, O.P., notes the strange ordering of questions in Summae
Theologiae, I-II: "The ordering of these questions in St. Thomas is problematic. He states,
'counsel precedes choice, therefore choice is to be considered first, and counsel second, as
if he were to say, because counsel comes before choice, choice should be treated before
counsel and counsel after choice. A preposterous ordering." ('Mirabilis videtur ratio
ordinem harum quaestiones apud S. Thomam; ait enim: "Electionem praecedit consilium;
primo ergo considerandum de electione; secundo, de consilio , ac si diceret: quia consilium
est ante electionem, ideo agendum est de electione ante consilium et de consilio post
electionem. Ordo praeposterus"). J. M. RAMIREZ, IV OPERA OMNIA: IN I-I SUMMAE
THEOLOGIAE Dm THOMAE ExPoSITIO QQ. VI-XXI 322 (Victorius Rodriguez ed., Instituto
de Filosofia <(Luis Vivess 1972).
Ramirez attempts to resolve this apparent absurdity by arguing that Aquinas is
interested in presenting an analysis of human action not strictly from a sequential
psychological point of view but, in keeping with the general moral purpose of the Summae
Theologiae, I-II, from the psychological order in relation to the moral order. Since
deliberation is ordered to choice and choice is ordered to the end, and is essentially
voluntary, it is proper for Aquinas to consider choice first. Id. at 322-24.
Ramirez's interpretation is consistent with the interpretation of Aquinas adopted in this
study. By postponing his analysis of counsel or deliberation until after his analysis of
choice, Aquinas emphasize, in a manner easily overlooked on a reverse ordering, that the
manner in which choice "follows" deliberation is not to be understood according to a
efficient necessitation. In fact, as argued below, choice itself causes or constitutes the final
judgment itself. The absence of a necessary relation between judgment and choice is
clearly indicated by Aquinas when he states that the conclusion of the syllogism is itself
"a judgment or choice or action," thus identifying all three in a concrete choice. Supra note
91 and accompanying text.
147 See supra Part III.C.i.
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Aquinas should make use of the analogy of sight at all. Vision is
a cognitive power, while will is an appetitive power. On
reflection, however, the parallel suggests that Aquinas employs
the analogy to stress the agent's free control over the faculty of
will. Just as a person is able freely to direct both the exercise
and specification of sight to any colored object he chooses, so too,
a person is able freely to direct, by and in choice, the exercise and
specification of his or her will to any object understood as
rationally good.
At this juncture it is also possible to resolve the question raised
above concerning the objection that choice is necessitated
because it follows conclusions of "practical" syllogisms.148 In
response to this objection, Thomas had stated enigmatically that
judgments of practical reason bear on contingent events which
might be brought about by our action, stating, "[b]ut in such
matters, conclusions are not derived from absolutely necessary
principles but only conditionally necessary principles, as for
example, if he runs, he moves."149
Based on the preceding considerations, his meaning becomes
evident. The relationship between intended ends and means in
situations open to alternative courses of conduct is dissimilar to
scientific reasoning which permits only one possible conclusion.
In practical matters, with respect to a single intended end (major
premise), multiple means may be available (minor premises),
thus opening up the possibility of multiple final practical
conclusions or judgments concerning how the end is to be
attained.150 As, for example, an intention to improve one's
health can be accomplished in more than just one way, thus
creating the possibility of multiple practical judgments that
might freely be adopted in pursuit of that end.
Aquinas's point is that the necessity of any practical conclusion
informing a choice exists only by supposition. As is clear from his
general account of will, other than the first indeterminate
movements of the intellect and will to the universal good, no
judgment of practical good necessarily specifies the will or its
exercise. Because of this, the necessity of any particular
148 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
150 For discussion of the applicability of syllogistic models of thought to practical
reasoning, see supra note 90.
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judgment specifying choice obtains only if one assumes that the
actor freely chooses according to that judgment rather than
another. The necessity of such judgments informing those
choices is then said to be conditionally or suppositionally
necessary. As Aquinas clarifies, even though a person may be
free to sit, run, or walk; on the supposition or assumed condition
that "a person runs," it is indeed conditionally necessary that the
person "moves". While it is not necessary that a person run-if
he runs-it follows necessarily that he moves.
Similarly, though choice is not antecedently determined to
"follow" one possible 'conclusion' or another, if one freely chooses
one way or another, it is necessary that that choice be specified
by its own judgment. The necessity of such a judgment is then
'conditioned' upon the supposition that the will has drawn up
that self-specifying judgment by choice. By the very same self-
motion, then, the will both exercises and specifies choice. This
view is reflected, for example, in texts where Aquinas speaks of
judgment, choice, and action as being in a certain sense
identified: "Thus, a person considering practical action uses a
type of syllogism whose conclusion is a judgment or choice or
action."151
4. Aquinas and Voluntarism
The preceding elaboration of Aquinas's theory of choice
naturally lies open to accusations of arbitrary voluntarism,
insofar as, in the end, the only sufficient causal factor accounting
for choosing one way or another is the freedom of the will itself.
Some argue that this account renders choice arbitrary or
irrational, for it explicitly fails to provide a sufficient rational
explanation for why the person chooses in accord with one
practical judgment rather than another, when both options were
equally available for choice.
An appropriate response to this objection requires more
detailed consideration of the exact sort of voluntarism or
arbitrariness alleged. As one author has described the
accusation of voluntarism:
151 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I-II, q. 76, a. 1. "Conferens enim de agendis,
utitur quodam syllogismo cuius conclusio est iudicium seu electio vel operatio."
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The intellectualist account pictures the will having to
follow what the intellect concludes; the voluntarist
account says that the will is free to decide on an action
no matter what the intellect comes up with.152
The notion of voluntarism implicit in this statement echoes
Susan Wolfs rejection of autonomy. As she argued, autonomy
involves the actor in making decisions on "no basis."153
Voluntarism understood in this sense implies a complete
autonomy of will enabling it to choose objects apart from or
contrary to judgments of reason.
The interpretation of Aquinas offered here, of course, is not
susceptible to accusations of this sort of arbitrariness or
irrationality. All acts of will are dominated and mediated by
reference to rational good. As illustrated above, the very first
principle inclining the agent to make use of the volitional 'power'
at all is an orientation to indeterminate rational good. Further,
both in the particular end intended and means chosen, there
must always be a rational basis providing the formal objective of
the will's inclination.
The will, then, is inherently and necessarily ordered toward
seeking good as rationally conceived. In choice, the very
possibility of the will choosing one object rather another arises
only because reason itself grasps alternatives as 'rationally' good,
and so constitutes the very basis of their 'desirability.' 54 As
Aquinas's analogy between vision and volition illustrates, just as
sight cannot be understood without reference to colored objects,
so too willing cannot be understood without reference to rational
good.
152 Daniel Westberg, Did Aquinas Change His Mind About the Will?, 11 THE THOMIST
41, 51 (1994).
153 See FREEDOM WITHIN REASON, supra note 24, at 54 (providing "this ability to
make radical choices is ... opaque. Since a radical choice must be made on no basis, and
involves the exercise of no faculty, there can be no explanation of why or how the agent
chooses to make the radical choices she does") (emphasis added).
154 As some philosophers restate this:
The point is that whatever is willed is willed according to some order of reason.
Whatever is willed is willed because one has grasped through reason some
goodness in the object, either as good in itself or as having an order to
something good in itself.... The will determines itself to will this or that
particular object, even though the order of each particular object to the end,
and hence its ability to attract the will, is provided by reason or intellect.
BOYLE ET. AL., supra note 8, at 335-36.
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In short, in choice the will can direct the intellect toward
consideration of one good rather than others and so choose freely,
but it is always the intellect and not the will that grasps the
character of the goodness in question and presents it before the
will for choice. The notion that the will can direct itself "no
matter what the intellect comes up with" plays no part in
Aquinas's theory.
At the same time, it must be conceded that Aquinas's position
does suggest a delineated indeterminate autonomy of the will.
For insofar as reason alone, though providing a necessary
condition for choice, does not necessitate the will to exercise its
choice of any specific rational good, no "sufficient reason"
explains why an agent chooses one good over another. As argued,
it is Aquinas's view that the specification of choice-ultimately
generated out of the indeterminism of the 'universal good'-
requires positing that it is the freedom of the will itself and
nothing else that sufficiently explains an agent selecting which
particular rational good he or she prefers, "But that the will
determinately exercises this act rather than that act is not
determined by anything else, but by the will itself." 55
The unique goodness of the object chosen, of course, to some
extent explains an agent's choice; it offers an intelligibility for the
choice not offered in the alternative(s). By way of illustration, in
deciding between apples and oranges, one might respond to a
question about why one chooses an apple rather than an orange
precisely by referring to the qualities in the apple, i.e., it is in a
unique way "juicy, sweet, and red." If one were to ask, however,
for a sufficient rational explanation for why one prefers these
qualities to the "tangy, acidic sweetness" of an orange, that is,
"why do you prefer apples to oranges?"-no answer can usually
be offered, other than to repeat that one just prefers one taste to
the other. Choice is explained by appeal to the specific goodness
of the chosen option that is not offered by the others. This,
however, does not explain, by means of an exhaustive or
"sufficient reason" why the actor freely chooses one form of
rational goodness rather than another.
The answer to such questions can be found only by appeal to
the agent's exercise of freedom. The agent chooses this object
155 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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rather than another because the person wants that sort of good
more than he wants another sort of rational good. And for this,
as Thomas states, there is no sufficient explanation other than
the very choice the actor makes. While the decision to choose
this way rather than that cannot fully be explained by a reason,
it can be explained by appealing to the agent's efficacy in
preferring one type of good over a different good. Thus, the agent
and the agent alone, is responsible for free choice.
While this interpretation may remain unsatisfactory to anyone
who demands a sufficient explanation for choice, it appears to be
the only explanation which can preserve personal and moral
responsibility. For, any theory proposing that a judgment of
reason can sufficiently explain the exercise and specification of
choice inescapably faces the impossible task of showing how
choice could still be free.
The unacceptable deterministic consequence of attributing
sufficient causality to reasons clarifies that in order to be
actually and unconditionally able to do otherwise, that is, to be
free in a substantial sense, an agent's choice cannot be fully
determined by reason. Only by preserving some sense in which
the agent himself, and nothing else, definitively determines
choice can the possibility of a sui generis mode of personal
causality be explained that justifies attribution of personal
responsibility.
The account of free choice offered here, then, hinges upon an
ability of the agent to determine himself without a sufficient
reason, but not without any reason or against reason. While no
sufficient reason explains why the will inclines to this specifying
rational object rather than another, appeal can be made to the
person's freedom of will and to the specific good chosen.
This account appears to provide the only adequate explanation
that preserves the possibility of human agents freely and
rationally choosing one way or another. Noting a relevant
distinction between a sufficient explanation and a rationally
adequate explanation, Richard Sorabji comments:
[E]xplanation is relative to the kind of question that
needs to be answered. When someone asks for an
explanation, he often (not always) has a contrast in
mind. He may want one thing explained in face of
another.... The questioner may want us to explain
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why an electron hit the trigger, in face of the fact that
this amount of material, exposed for this amount of
time, would not always irradiate a similarly placed
mechanism. If this is the question, there is no answer.
On the other hand, the questioner may want us to
explain why an electron hit the trigger, in face of the
fact that in other rooms, and in this room at other
times, levels of radiation are normally zero. In that
case, it is a perfectly good explanation to point out
that the radioactive material was left out on the
bench.... It distorts the situation to say that there is
no explanation of why an electron hit the trigger. It is
only in relation to certain questions that an
explanation is unavailable.
... But then ought we to expect that there will be an
explanation available corresponding to every contrast
that we care to choose?156
To the question of why an electron is in one location rather
than another, no answer is possible. If, however, an explanation
is sought for how an electron could be located in one or other
particular place, when it is not located at that same place at
other times, quantum mechanics does provide an answer to that.
To the extent that Thomas' account provides a rational
framework for human willing, any direct parallel between the
apparently complete randomness of quantum mechanics and
human choice appears inapt.157 Sorabji's comments are apropos,
however, inasmuch as they suggest that the lack of a sufficient
answer to one question (i.e., 'why does the will freely choose one
object rather than another), does not undermine the adequacy of
a rational answer to a different question (i.e., 'how can the will
freely choose one object rather than another.')
156 RICHARD SORABJI, NECESSITY, CAUSE, AND BLAME: PERSPECTIVES ON
ARISTOTLES'S THEORY 29-31 (1980).
157 It is difficult to understand how random events could ever suffice to account for
moral freedom and responsibility. As one philosopher states this view, "although there is
strong empirical evidence that nature is at bottom indeterministic, it is not so clear that
indeterminism of the right sort [for freedom of action] can be generated via a direct
function from quantum indeterminacy." Timothy O'Connor, Emergent Properties, 31.2 AM.
PHIL. Q. 91, 100 (1994); see supra note 11.
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Confusion about the difference between these questions is
responsible in large part for the claim that freedom entails
incoherency. Responding, for example, to legal scholar Peter
Westen's158 argument that the problem of free will collapses upon
itself because there is no sense at all in which free choice can be
coherently conceived of,15 9 the preceding account suggests an
alternative view-one that does not beg the question by
assuming that the only rational explanation demands a
completely sufficient, i.e., deterministic, explanation. Theories of
free choice such as Aquinas's offer an account of causation which,
though not able to explain a choice completely, provide an
appropriately loose causal account to overcome objections of
incoherence, randomness and unintelligibility.
While avoiding the weaknesses of purely causal accounts of
free choice that inevitably churn out deterministic results,
Aquinas's account proposes a hybrid model of causality and
indeterminacy, appealing at times to notions of efficient causality
and at other times to causal indeterminacy without reducing the
explanation to either extreme.
The inability to offer a sufficient explanation of free choice does
not, then, detract from its adequacy. Rather an 'incomplete'
rational explanation is demanded in order to preserve a theory of
freedom of choice. In particular, Aquinas's conception of free
choice accounts for how "reasons" possess explanatory efficacy,
but not as antecedent sufficient causes of choice. At the same
time, his account avoids the alternative implication that choice
depends upon conditions so entirely irrational and random as to
sever all meaningful connection with human actors.
As correctly noted by philosophers like Ayer and Mill,160
choices are differentiated from one another precisely by their
differing rational specification. If an actor chooses one way, his
choice is necessarily informed by a differing rational content than
that which would inform the choice of an actor choosing
otherwise. These philosophers failed to realize, however, that
such specification does not require determinism. For every
choice, even a free choice, must necessarily have a rational
formality defining its character. As Aquinas clarifies, this
158 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
159 Id.
160 See supra notes 5 and 14.
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"necessity" is not antecedently imposed, but is itself a result of
the process of choosing freely. For Thomas, it is by the very
exercise of a free choice that a person determines which
judgment of reason shall specify it, not a judgment of reason
predetermining which choice shall be exercised.
CONCLUSION
Modern theories of choice reject strong conceptions of freedom
because they believe that the notion of autonomy entailed by
these theories leaves no plausible room for attributing
responsibility to the actor. As a result, such theorists fall back
upon deterministic accounts of freedom to justify personal
responsibility. Choice, as described on deterministic models, at
least has no difficulty associating an agent causally with his
conduct.
As has been shown, however, such 'caused' freedom, provides
no meaningful sense in which it remains up to the agent to "want
what he wants to want."161 No matter how many 'loops' or
complexities may be introduced, if the unfolding of self-
determining choices ultimately traces back to sufficient causes
antecedent to an agent's choice, then action cannot be attributed
to the agent in any sense constitutive of true personal
responsibility. While such agents may play a functional role in
their own self-determination, it would be a role that carries with
it no basis for blame or praise.
On an alternative model of free choice, proposed by Thomas
Aquinas, the very exercise of practical reason in deliberation and
choice requires a certain kind of autonomy. By virtue of the
indeterminate initial states of human cognitional and volitional
faculties, persons are able to grasp and be attracted to multiple,
alternative conceptions of good. This lack of determination, in
turn, creates the possibility of persons selecting for themselves
which particular conception of good shall inform their practical
thinking and to which they shall commit themselves by choice.
In short, these basic orientations of the human mind and will
suggest a kind of autonomous model of reasoning that Susan
Wolf had raised for consideration but dismissed. In connection
161 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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with Wolfs rejection of autonomy and retreat into determinism,
she noted in passing that such a conception of free choice would
demand a concept of a 'person' viewed as "a prime mover
unmoved, whose deepest self is itself neither random nor
externally determined, but is rather determined by itself - who
is, in other words, self-created."162 In fact, it is not uncommon in
scholarly discussion to see strong conceptions of free choice
dismissed precisely because they implausibly call for some
unconditional 'divine-like' quality to be attributed to human
persons.163
While Wolf, for this very reason, denies autonomy as an
appropriate model for choice, Thomas consciously embraces this
insight:
Because... man is made in the image of God
inasmuch as there is signified by the term 'image'
being intellectual, and endowed with free will and self-
active ... it remains for us to consider His image, i.e.,
man, insofar as he is the principle of his acts, having
free choice and power over his deeds.164
Affirmations that human persons reflect in this way an image
of the divine are, of course, not unknown in philosophical and
religious circles. Yet, even in these contexts, discussions often
blithely treat its justification-the having of an intellect and
will-as if it were simply a matter of checking off nominal traits
shared by divine and human persons. In fact, it is Thomas's
understanding of precisely what it means to have an intellect and
will, that is, of the remarkable nature of these faculties, that
explains why having them makes one, in very fact, god-like.
162 Sanity, supra note 30, at 52.
163 Daniel C. Dennett, for example, suggests that the main concerns about the
problem of free choice arise from a human aspiration to be the origin of our deliberations
and choices as persons exercising "absolute agenthood" - to be a perfect, God-like self-
creator. DANIEL C. DENNET, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING
83-85 (1984). Similarly, Roderick Chisholm in discussing agent causation speaks of agents
as in the Aristotelian sense of "prime movers unmoved." Roderick Chisholm, Human
Freedom and the Self, in FREE WILL 26, 28-32 (Gary Watson ed., Oxford Univ. Press
2003).
164 SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I-II, PROLOGUS "Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit,
homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur secundum quod per imaginem significatur
intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum . . . restat us consideremus de eius
imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi
liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatum."
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The possibility of free choice requires a radical understanding
of the mind and will as faculties that inherently orient the person
to a conception of indeterminate unlimited goodness. And only in
this insight can Thomas's parallel between divine being and
human persons become fully comprehensible.
Specifically, Aquinas understands a parallel to exist, first,
between God's necessary knowing and willing of his own infinite,
unbounded goodness, and that inchoate, intuitive inclination to
'universal good' known and willed by human persons. Just as
God necessarily wills his infinite fullness-of-being and goodness,
so too human persons necessarily know and love the conception
of unlimited goodness constituted naturally by practical reason.
Similarly, as in God the love of his own infinite goodness
cannot be adequately captured by any single determinate, and
thus, limited creation, and thus any creation by God requires a
free choice on his part to bring it about;165 so too, human persons'
original 'love' of the 'universal good' necessitates no choice, but
rather, through the natural inclination to infinite good, human
persons must freely determine themselves to specific choices.
Thus both in the case of divine choice and human choice, it is the
unlimited character of the first principles of action that account
for the possibility of freedom. 166
Thomas, of course, concedes that in a metaphysical sense, one's
deepest self must be determined by causes outside of oneself;
human nature is not entitatively self-creating. Rather than
eliminating freedom, however, this initial entitative
determination of the human person to know and seek
indeterminate 'universal good' provides the foundation for free
action. 167 Based on these basic inclinations to the good, human
165 Since divine nature is not determinate being, but contains in itself the total
perfection of all being, it is not possible for it to act by the necessity of nature ....
Therefore, God does not act by the necessity of nature, but determinate effects proceed
from his infinite nature by means of the determination of his will and intellect. ("Cum
igitur esse divinum non sit determinatum, sed contineat in se totam perfectionem essendi,
non potest esse quod agat per necessitatem naturae,.... .Non igitur agit per
necessitatem naturae sed effectus determinati ab infinita ipsius perfectione procedunt
secundum determinationem voluntatis et intellectus ipsius"). Id. at I, q. 19, a. 4.
166 For further discussion of this analogy see Laura L. Garcia, Divine Freedom and
Creation, 42 PHIL. Q. 191, 199 (1992).
167 Having an initial state determined by outside causes, but in such a way as to be
constituted in some way precisely as 'undetermined,' that is, in the way proper to human
intellect and will, does not for Aquinas introduce a determinism into subsequent activity
depriving the actor of the freedom necessary for personal responsibility. As he states:
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persons are induced to exercise self-actualization through specific
free choices and actions. In contrast, then, to an absolute and,
therefore, incoherent sense of being a causa sui, a 'cause of
oneself,' Aquinas posits a qualified sense of self-creation; human
persons 'create' themselves morally and ethically by what they do
with that indeterminacy. 168
While Aquinas's account of autonomy may indeed imply
something 'divine-like' about human persons, this does not
inevitably entail incoherence. Rather, in contrast to the
diminished sense of determined freedom acceptable to some, it
suggests the possibility of another type of freedom, the kind of
freedom through which-in the words but not spirit of
That which is moved by another is coerced if it moves contrary to its natural
inclination; if however a thing is moved by another who imparts to it its proper
inclination, this is not considered coercion .... Thus God ... does not coerce
the will, because he gives it its proper inclination .... To move voluntarily is to
move by means of one's own initiative, that is, by an intrinsic principle; that
intrinsic principle itself, however, can be caused by an extrinsic principle, and
thus to move oneself does not contradict the notion of being moved by another.
("quod illud quod movetur ab altero dicitur cogi, si moveatur contra
inclinationem propriam, sed si moveatur ab alio quod sibi dat propriam
inclinationem, non dicitur cogi; .... Sic igitur Deus, ... non cogit ipsam, quia
dat ei eius propriam inclinationem ..... Quod moveri voluntarie est moveri ex
se, idest a principio intrinseco, sed illud principium intrinsecum potest esse ab
alio principio extrinseco. Et sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei quod movetur ab
alio.")
SUMMA THEO., supra note 66, at I, 105, a. 4, ad 4 and ad 5.
168 A substantive account of the specific norms guiding and directing human self-
determination plays a constitutive and essential role in almost every moral theory, and
does so in Aquinas's as well. Unfortunately, this topic exceeds the scope of analysis
possible here. For an valuable introduction to the topic see generally Martin Rhonheimer,
The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity, 67 THE
THOMIST 1 (2003).
Additionally, any appropriate theory of free choice must include consideration of the role
that dispositions play in forming cognitive and affective perceptions of particular 'goods'
constituted through various forms of conduct and concrete objects. For Aquinas, the role
of such dispostional habits (understood as virtues and vices) plays a large part in his
moral and action theory. As he notes: "according to the Philosopher [Aristotle], 'as a
person is disposed, so does the end appear to him,' .... Accordingly, if there is a habit or
disposition that is not natural, but subject to the choice of the will-as for example
something can be judged by habit or passion as good or bad in this particular case-it does
not move the will necessarily." ([S]ecundum Philosophum, qualis unusquisque est, talis
finis videtur ei.... Si autem sit talis dispositio quae non sit naturalis, sed subiacens
voluntati, puta, cum aliquid disponitur per habitum vel passionem ad hoc quod sibi
videatur aliquid vel bonum vel malum in hoc particulari, non ex necessitate movetur
voluntas.")
While the preceding Article has focused more on Aquinas's most fundamental account of
of free choice, this should not be taken to imply that free choice is not intimately affected
by dispositional states of the human person. For further discussion of the essential role
experience plays in forming an individual's dispositional and particular grasp of good and
its relation to choice, especially in a political context, see generally Edward C. Lyons,
Reason's Freedom and the Dialectic of Ordered Liberty, - CLEV. ST. L. REV. __
(2007)(forthcoming).
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Frankfurt-a person truly could "want what he wants to
want."169 It would in reality be 'all the freedom it is possible to
desire or conceive.'1 70
169 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (discussing Frankfurt's theories).
170 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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